Page 250 - The Chief Culprit

June 13, 1941 y 211

I have interviewed hundreds of people from that generation, and they all had forebod-
ings of the war. Where did they come from? ey could not have known about Hitler’s prepa-
rations. ey must have seen the preparations of the Red Army and understood that war was
unavoidable. General Lobachev described the extraordinary level of secrecy with which the
16th army was transferred: the trains were sent only by night and they did not stop at large
and medium stations; the staff of the 16th Army was moved in cargo railroad cars with the
doors and windows completely shut; at small stations, where the trains stopped, everyone
was forbidden to exit the train. At that time, a passenger train covered the Trans-Siberian
route in more than eleven days, while cargo trains were even slower. One could transport
soldiers and officers in fully closed cars, but here we are talking about the high-ranking staff
of an army. Such level of secrecy was unusual even by Soviet standards. In 1945, a flow of
troops going in the opposite direction traveled on the Trans-Siberian railroad, heading for a
surprise attack on Japanese troops in Manchuria and China. For the purposes of secrecy, all
the generals wore officers’ uniforms, with many fewer stars than they had earned, but they
still traveled in passenger trains. In 1941, on the other hand, generals were being transported
in cargo trains. What for?
ere were five military districts in the First Strategic Echelon of the Red Army. We
examined what happened in the Kiev special military district on June 13, 1941, and on the
days before and after that date. e same went on in the four other military districts. On June
14, the military council of the Odessa military district received an order to create an army
headquarters in Tiraspol. is indicated the creation of the 9th Army on the Romanian
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border. From June 14 to June 19, the military councils of all the western border districts
were directed to send out the frontline army commands to their field headquarters by June
22 and 23. Zhukov’s June 19 telegram to Kirponos, the commander of the Kiev special
military district, stated: “ e People’s Commissar of Defense has issued the following orders:
the command should leave for Ternopol by June 22, 1941, leaving the subordinate district
commander in Kiev. . . . e selection and transfer of front command is to be kept top secret,
and the district staff personnel should be notified of said secrecy.” Zhukov sent out similar
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telegrams to Kuznetsov, the commander of the Baltic special military district, and Pavlov, the
commander of the Western special military district, on the same day. e command of the
Northwestern Front, along with its district’s commander, should have arrived at Panevezhis
on June 22 and 23; the same should have happened on the Western front at Obuz-Lesni.
is mass exodus of front and army command units was approved by Stalin on the pretext of
conducting joint summer training for commanders and troops.
On June 14, the military council of the Baltic special military district approved a plan
for the relocation of a row of divisions and regiments to the border zone. Here are some
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standard reports from those days. Major General S. Iovlev (at the time commander of the
64th Rifle Division of the 44th Rifle Corps, 13th Army) recounted: “On June 15, 1941, the
commander of the Western special military district, General D. G. Pavlov, ordered the divi-
sions of our corps to prepare for relocation in complete formation. . . . We were not told our
destination.” Colonel General L. M. Sandalov (at that time colonel, chief of staff of the 4th
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Army of the Western special military district) remembered: “On the southern wing of the 4th
Army a new division appeared—the 75th Rifle Division. It advanced from Mosyr and set up
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well-concealed tent camps in the forests.”