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airplanes to these units was under way. Colonel General L. M. Sandalov recounted: “From
June 15, we began to receive new combat technology. Kobrinsky and Pruzhansky fighter regi-
ments received the Iak-1 fighters, armed with cannon; the ground attack regiment got the
Il-2 plane, the bomber regiments [got] the Pe-2.” 46
Fighter regiments of that time had sixty-two planes each, ground attack regiments had
sixty-three, and bomber regiments had sixty. Consequently, a single division (the 10th Mixed
Air Force) was awaiting the arrival of 247 new planes. e general reported that the division
did in fact begin to receive new technology, but old planes remained in the division. e divi-
sion turned into a giant combat organism, comprised of several hundred planes. is process
occurred everywhere. For example, the nearby 9th Mixed Air Force Division also received
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262 new MiG-1s and MiG-3s, as well as several tens of Pe-2s and Il-2s. On the morning of
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June 22, that same western front got an order to receive 99 MiG-3s at the Orsha airfield.
If they were to be received on the morning of June 22, the planes evidently were ready to be
shipped out on the evening of June 21. Chief Marshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov reported
that on June 21 the Northern Front, where he was commander of the air force, received a
trainload of MiG-3 fighters. 49
Besides the fighter planes, a mighty stream of tanks, artillery, ammunition, and fuel was
also flowing in. At dawn on June 22, a trainload of heavy artillery regiments came into the
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Siauliai station. ere were endless rows of trains full of ammunition. e Krasnaya Zvezda
noted: “On the evening of June 21, 1941, the supervisor of the railroad station at Liepaja
was told: ‘Receive a special train. It carries ammunition. It must be sent to its destination as
a matter of priority.’” Liepaja at that time was very close to the border, but the train was in
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transit, meaning it was going to the border lines.
Railroad cars on all fronts were full of ammunition, which was usually done in prepa-
ration for an offensive of great depth. In a defensive war, it was easier and cheaper to store
ammunition in previously prepared storage depots. Having used up all the ammunition from
one storage depot, the troops easily retreated to another, where ammunition awaited them,
then to a third, and so on. But before an invasion, ammunition was loaded onto mobile
transport, which was very risky and expensive. For example, the southwestern front had
1,500 railroad cars of ammunition at the small Kalinovka station alone. Colonel General I.
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I. Volkotrubenko reported that in 1941, after the German attack, the western front alone lost
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4,216 railroad cars of ammunition. ere were five fronts, and it is incredible how much
ammunition was stored on all fronts. Some of it fell into German hands; some of it was suc-
cessfully rescued. In the middle of June, that incredible number of troops and ammunition—
under the cover of the TASS announcement—was rolling toward the German borders in
railroad cars.
Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Kurkotkin reported that in the beginning of June
the “Soviet government, following a proposal by the General Staff, approved a plan to move
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100,000 tons of fuel from the inland regions of the country.” In addition, “about 8,500
railroad cisterns with fuel [were] amassed at railroad intersections.” If the smallest 20-ton
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cisterns were being used, this would have meant much more than 100,000 tons. e most
frequently used cistern in 1941 was the 62-ton. ese 8,500 containers were at the stations
waiting to be unloaded in the first days of the war. We also have to take into account all that
was destroyed by enemy air raids at the railroad stations in the first minutes and hours of the