Page 255 - The Chief Culprit

216 y e Chief Culprit

war. Colonel General I. V. Boldin, deputy commander of the Western Front, related that the
10th Army (the most powerful army on the Western Front) had sufficient supplies of fuel in
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storage and in railroad containers, but lost everything in the first minutes of the war. On
the eve of the war, this mass of cisterns was moving toward the borders, together with troops,
military equipment, weapons, and ammunition.
June 13, 1941, marked the beginning of the biggest organized movement of troops,
arms, ammunition, and other military supplies in history. Now is the right time to look once
again at the TASS announcement of June 13. Many historians for some reason focus their at-
tention on the introduction of this announcement, which speaks of German intentions. But
the TASS announcement also speaks of Soviet intentions, and the most interesting informa-
tion is contained there: “Rumors that the USSR is preparing for war against Germany are
false and provocative. . . . e gathering of air forces and reserves of the Red Army and the
impending maneuvers have as their objective nothing but [the] training of reserves and [the]
testing of railroad functioning; they are conducted, as is known, yearly, so to imagine that
these events are hostile to Germany is ridiculous.” Comparing the announcement with what
occurred in reality, we find a big discrepancy between words and deeds.
e TASS announcement talked about the “testing of railroad functioning.” is is
questionable. e movement of Soviet troops began in February, in March it intensified, in
April and May it reached grandiose proportions, and starting on June 13, 1941, it reached
an all-encompassing character. e only divisions that did not participate in the move were
those already at the border, those that remained in the Far East, and those that were preparing
to invade Iran. e full concentration of Soviet troops along the German border was planned
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for July 10. For almost half a year, railroad transportation, the main means of transportation
in the country, was paralyzed by secret troop transfers. In the first half of 1941, the govern-
ment plan for industry was only fulfilled for the military requirements. e main reason
was that transportation was almost exclusively used for secret military transfers. e second
reason was the secret mobilization of the male population to the newly formed armies. e
disruption of the government plan could hardly be called “testing.”
e TASS announcement described it as “usual training,” but Soviet marshals, generals,
and admirals contradicted that claim. Major General S. Iovlev said: “ e unusual aspect of
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the gatherings, not foreseen by plans of war readiness, alerted people.” Vice Admiral I. I.
Azarov remembered: “Usually, training was conducted closer to the fall, but here they were
beginning in the middle of the summer.” Colonel General I. I. Ludnikov said: “Usually, re-
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serves are called in after the crops have been harvested. . . . In 1941, this rule was broken.”
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Major General M. I. Kazakov at that time was at the General Staff headquarters. ere,
he encountered the commander of the 16th Army, Lieutenant General M. F. Lukin, and
other generals. eir armies were secretly being transferred by train; the commanders of the
armies moved ahead of their troops and arrived in Moscow by airplane. In Moscow, they
received their last instructions. General Kazakov said: “It was clear that it was not maneuvers
they were going to. It was something else.” 61
Did Stalin have a premonition and concentrate troops along the borders for defense?
at explanation is implausible. e massive operation described above couldn’t be defensive.
Troops preparing for defense dig themselves into the ground. ey take over the largest fields
that the enemy will have to cross, close off roads, establish barbwire barriers, dig anti-tank