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high-frequency lines, the Operational Directorate of the General Staff. e deputy chief
of the directorate, A. F. Anisov, came to the telephone. After telling him about the cable I
received from Reiter, I asked for clarification. Anisov replied that Reiter’s cable was to be
immediately destroyed, that Reiter would receive the necessary orders from the General
Staff, while the staff of the district should not get involved in this matter. 6

e commander of the Odessa district, Colonel General I. T. Cherevichenko also knew
nothing of the Annushkas.
Some Soviet marshals, including Zhukov, said that twenty-eight rifle divisions were
moving out from the deeper inland territories of the country. is is true, but it is not the
entire truth. Marshal A. M. Vassilevsky stressed that twenty-eight divisions only “laid the
foundation for the execution of the troop gathering plan.” Twenty-eight divisions were only
7
the beginning. We know that there was a continuation, which surpassed the beginning, but
Marshal Vassilevsky, after having spoken a little, grew silent and did not name concrete fig-
ures. If we compile all the data contained in all present-day military history works, we will
find out that in May and June of 1941 seven armies were moved from the interior military
districts to the western borders. Besides that, several independent corps were on their way
8
west, including the 9th Special Rifle Corps, the 31st Rifle Corps, and the 27th Mechanized
Corps. e total number of transferred divisions was seventy-seven, plus there was a huge
number of independent combat and auxiliary formations.
On June 13, 1941, Molotov summoned the German ambassador and related to him the
text of the TASS announcement. e announcement stated that Germany did not want to
9
attack the USSR, and the USSR did not want to attack Germany, but “enemies of Germany
and the USSR interested in unleashing and broadening war” were trying to make them quar-
rel and were spreading provocations and rumors of imminent war. In the announcement,
these “enemy forces” are listed by name: “the British ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Kripps,”
“London,” and “the English press.” Our exploration of the day would not be complete if we
do not turn to London on June 13, 1941.
It is reasonable to suppose that on June 13 there was a meeting in London between the
Soviet ambassador I. M. Maysky and the British foreign minister Anthony Eden. Indeed, the
meeting was held, and, surprisingly, in a friendly atmosphere. Discussion revolved around
a serious issue: measures Britain would take to aid the Red Army “if in the near future a
war between the USSR and Germany begins.” Among other specific measures were military
operations by the British air force, the transfer of military supplies, and the coordination of
command between the two countries. 10
On June 13, 1941, Stalin’s diplomats were laying the foundation of what would soon be
called the “Anti-Hitler Coalition.” From the British point of view, there was nothing wrong
with this picture: at that moment, Britain was involved in a war against Hitler, and had full
rights to talk with anyone about joint efforts against him. But the Soviet Union had signed a
pact of non-aggression with Germany, and immediately after that an agreement of friendship.
If Soviet leadership thought that these documents no longer suited the situation at hand, they
should have had them annulled. But Stalin did not do this; he assured Hitler of friendship
and in the TASS announcement denounced the British ambassador and press for “wanting to
broaden the war.” At the same time, talks in London were under way concerning a military
alliance with Germany’s enemy, and about specific military measures against Germany.