Page 261 - The Chief Culprit
P. 261

36


                           Red Army, Black Gulag Uniforms










                     mmediately after the partition of Poland in the fall of 1939, a large number of Soviet
                     troops were transferred from their permanent stations to the new borders. But the new
                 Iterritories were not adapted to the permanent deployment of large quantities of troops,
                 especially troops with a lot of military equipment.
                       e History of the Second World War tells us: “ e troops in [the] western border dis-
                 tricts experienced many difficulties. Everything had to be built and equipped anew: bases
                 and supply points, airfields, systems of roads, lines of communication.”   e official history
                                                                           1
                 of the Byelorussian military district says: “Movement of units from the district to western
                 parts of Byelorussia caused considerable difficulties. . . .  e personnel of the 3rd, 10th and
                 4th armies . . . were busy with repair work and building barracks, storages, [and] camps,
                 [and] furnishing training sites, shooting ranges, and tank depots.  e troops were under con-
                 siderable strain.”  Colonel General L. M. Sandalov: “ e movement of district troops here
                               2
                 encountered huge difficulties.  e barracks were miserably few. . . . For troops not provided
                 with barracks, dugouts were being built.” 3
                      But troops kept arriving. General Sandalov says that in order to house all the troops
                 in 1939–40, storages, barracks, and any kind of space was being used. “A large amount of
                 troops concentrated in Brest. . . . Four-tiered bunks were set up on the lower floors of the
                 barracks.”  Lieutenant General V. N. Kurdumov, the head of the Battle Training Directorate
                         4
                 of the Red Army, had said in December 1940 at a meeting of the command staff that, in
                 the new regions, troops often were forced to spend their time doing housework instead of
                               5
                 military training.  At the same meeting Lieutenant General I. N. Fedorenko, the head of
                 the Automobile-Tank Directorate, said that almost all tank units in 1939–40 changed their
                 positions, sometimes up to three or four times. As a result, “more than half of the units that
                                                      6
                 moved to new places had no training ranges.”  At the cost of tremendous effort, in 1939 and
                 1940 the troops of the First Strategic Echelon were set up and quartered. But from February
                 1941, at first slowly, then faster and faster, the seven armies of the Second Strategic Echelon
                 began pouring into the same areas. At that moment, a change occurred that has not been



                                                     222
   256   257   258   259   260   261   262   263   264   265   266