Page 269 - The Chief Culprit

230 y e Chief Culprit

Forty-nine years later the same explanation was given by the Deputy Chief of the
General Staff of the Soviet Military Forces, General Makhmut Gareev: “A main blow to the
flank in the main alignment of the enemy’s troops, delivered in the direction of Krakow,
would have allowed us to cut Germany off from the Balkans in the very beginning of the war,
to deprive her of the Romanian oil, and to separate the allies. On the other hand, carrying
out the main blow on the joint flanks of the western and northwestern fronts led to a frontal
attack in difficult conditions against heavily fortified defense positions in East Prussia, where
the German army could offer fiercer resistance. And totally different conditions, and conse-
quently different objections, could have arisen if the strategic plans were to lead defensive
operations to deflect aggression early in the war. In this case, no doubt, it was more advan-
tageous to have main forces in the strip of the western front. But such a course of strategic
actions was not planned.” 2
Let’s compare the opinions of the two generals. ey are saying the same thing: there
was no preparation for defense, only offense, moreover, an offensive in the southwestern di-
rection (that is, from the Lvov bulge) with the objective of cutting Germany off from her oil
suppliers and main allies. If someone places on the map the Soviet Shock armies, mechanized
and airborne corps, air bases, staffs, and Zhukov’s generals, he will be forced to acknowledge,
even without Vlassov and Gareev’s testimonies, that such positioning of troops in the bulges
directed toward the enemy could only lead to catastrophe in the event of an invasion by the
enemy, while it would lead to a brilliant victory in the event that the Red Army was first to
deliver its sudden crushing blow.
Between the Baltic and Black Seas lie the impassible swamps of Polesye. is is the larg-
est area of swamps in Europe. ese swamps divided the entire theater of military operations
into two regions, two strategic directions. An enemy advancing toward Russia from the west
must choose the direction of his main blow: he can go to the north of Polesye, or to the south.
Traditionally, conquerors advancing from the west went north of Polesye: Warsaw-Brest-
Litovsk-Minsk-Smolensk—this is a direct route to Moscow. e question before Hitler’s
strategists was: where to plan the primary blow, north of Polesye or south? Hitler’s strategists
decided that the primary blow was to come to the north, the secondary to the south. In 1941
Hitler had four tank groups. ree of them were designated for action north of Polesye, and
one to the south.
Soviet military intelligence knew of the concentration of German troops and knew that
three tank groups would act against the Baltic and Byelorussian areas, while only one would
go against the Ukraine. What should the Soviet command have done? Since the Germans
prepared the primary blow to the north of the swamps, the main forces of the Red Army
should also have been placed there—in the western direction. Even if Soviet intelligence had
not known anything about Hitler’s plans, the main forces should have been kept in the west-
ern direction. It is obvious even to the lowest ranking officer that the direct route to Moscow
runs through Byelorussia and Smolensk.
Troop alignment is, figuratively speaking, equal to positioning chess figures on the
board. e General Staff is the brain of the army. e Chief of the General Staff is the most
capable and smartest general in the entire army. Starting in February 1941, Zhukov was
chief of the General Staff. Here is the situation we are examining: on June 22, the Germans
delivered the primary blow north of Polesye and crushed Soviet armies in the Belostok bulge,
from where the German tank groups could head toward Smolensk and Moscow. Meanwhile,