Page 270 - The Chief Culprit

Military Alignment y 231

Zhukov’s main forces were not there, but south of Polesye. e direction facing the great-
est threat was north of the swamps. Conquerors from the west have always advanced to the
north, but Zhukov deployed his main alignment to the south.
e consequences of Zhukov’s positioning were catastrophic. In order to divert the
attack on Moscow, the Red Army had to send, urgently and under heavy enemy bombers’
raids, railway trains with divisions, corps, and armies from the Southwestern Front to the
Western Front. ere, again under heavy bombing, the trains were unloaded and the troops
went straight into battle. What happened was that the 16th Army was advanced from the
Trans-Baikal region to Ukraine, meaning south of Polesye. e army had just begun to un-
load when the German invasion happened. ey were forced to urgently load the 16th Army
back into trains and herd it several hundred kilometers to the north. e staff of the 16th
Army arrived at Smolensk from Ukraine and began to unload, but the communications bat-
talion could not be found. Without communications, it is impossible to command troops.
An entire army found itself without command. is is what must be called a “headless army.”
e culprit here is not Stalin, but Zhukov, who in May and early June moved a large part of
the armies of the second strategic echelon to the south of Polesye, instead of to the north.
is is just one example, there are plenty more. e 19th Army was secretly moved
from the North Caucasus to Ukraine, in other words, south of Polesye. is army also began
to unload. It was ordered to get back on the trains and sent to Smolensk. e same thing hap-
pened: the artillery was unloaded in one place, while the trains with shells had not yet arrived.
Tanks were there, but the repair crews had not arrived. e division staffs were there, but the
troops were still far behind. What was General Zhukov thinking about before the German in-
vasion? Why was the strongest Soviet military district before the war not the Western district,
which was in the most threatened area, but the Kiev district? If Zhukov had been thinking of
defense, he of course would have deployed the most powerful Soviet groupings in the most
threatened areas—north of Polesye.
But Zhukov was not thinking of defense, and was not planning for it. ere is plenty
of testimony that right before the invasion Zhukov, Vatutin, Vasilevsky, and all the generals
and officers of the General Staff worked sixteen and seventeen hours a day without weekends
or holidays. “ e areas for the concentration of primary efforts were not chosen by the Soviet
commanders in the interests of strategic defense operations (such an operation was simply
not foreseen and not planned), but for entirely different means of action,” wrote Gareev.
3
If we prepare to deliver a sudden all-crushing blow to Germany and her allies, we must
also choose the direction of the primary attack: north of Polesye, or south. If we attack to
the north, we find ourselves in East Prussia, which is heavily fortified and populated with
Germans who will offer resistance. In this area we can only advance from east to west along
the shores of the Baltic Sea, so all the rivers and streams would have to be crossed in their
lower currents, almost at their mouths. Among those rivers, there are two powerful water bar-
riers: the Vistula and the Oder. In their middle, and especially in their lower currents, they are
extremely difficult to cross. However, if we strike south of Polesye the picture changes. In this
case, the Red Army would end up in the Krakow region. It is inhabited by Poles who, after
two years of German occupation, would have met any other army with flowers and offers of
help. Here, on the Polish plains, there are no formidable modern fortifications. Here one does
not need to expend efforts to cross rivers. In their upper currents they do not pose serious
barriers. If one carries out the attack south of Polesye, then during the advancement his left