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facts.” All Soviet sources publish Churchill’s message in this form, insisting and assuring that
it was a “warning.”
I see no warning here. Churchill was talking about three tank divisions—many by
Churchill’s standards, but by Stalin’s, it was not a great deal. Stalin himself at the time was
secretly setting up sixty-three tank divisions, each of which was stronger than a German divi-
sion both in number and in quality of tanks. Mass production of tanks was already set up in
the Soviet Union at that time, and they remained the best in the world throughout the war.
Nobody in the world, all through the war, created anything even close to the tanks that Stalin
had before the war even began. Having received a report about three German divisions, why
should Stalin have guessed that there would be an invasion? If the report about the three tank
divisions was sufficient “warning” about preparations of aggression, we should not accuse
Hitler of being the aggressor: German intelligence gave Hitler reports about tens of Soviet
tank divisions grouping along the German and Romanian borders.
Churchill suggested that Stalin assess “the significance of these facts.” How could they
be assessed? Poland, historically, has always been the gate through which all aggressors passed
from Central Europe to Russia. Hitler wanted to transfer tanks to Poland, but he changed
his mind. Compared to Poland, Romania was a very bad springboard for aggression. German
troops would be harder to supply there than in Poland. In an attack from Romania, the road
to the vital heartland of Russia would be longer and harder for an aggressor, who would
have to overcome a multitude of barriers, including the lower reaches of the river Dnepr.
Had Stalin been preparing himself for defense, and had he believed Churchill’s “warning,”
he should have breathed a sigh of relief and relaxed his military preparations. In addition,
Churchill explained why the German troops were staying in Romania instead of being trans-
ferred to Poland: the Germans had problems in Yugoslavia, particularly in Serbia. In other
words, Churchill said that the German tank divisions were left in Romania not for aggression
eastward against the Soviet Union, but on the contrary, from Romania they were pointed
southwest toward Serbia, with their backs to Stalin.
Churchill’s letter had tremendous significance, but it absolutely couldn’t be regarded
as a warning. It was more of an invitation to Stalin: the Germans wanted to transfer their di-
visions to Poland, but changed their minds; therefore, the Soviet Union had nothing to fear,
especially since the German tank divisions in Romania had their backs turned to Stalin.
Churchill wanted Stalin to evaluate these facts and act on them. Sir Basil Liddell Hart, the
4
British military historian, made a brilliant analysis of the strategic situation of that time as
seen from Hitler’s standpoint. According to General Jodl, to whom Liddell Hart referred,
Hitler repeatedly told his generals that Britain’s only hope was a Soviet invasion of Europe. 5
Churchill himself wrote on April 22, 1941, that “the Soviet government knows full well . . .
that we stand in need of its help.” e only way Stalin could help Britain was by attacking
6
Germany.
Hitler made one irremediable mistake, but not on July 21, 1940, when he ordered
preparations for war against the Soviet Union. e mistake came on August 19, 1939, when
he agreed to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Having agreed to the division of Poland, Hitler
had to confront an unavoidable war against the West, having behind him the “neutral”
Stalin. Precisely from this moment, Hitler had two fronts. e decision to begin Operation
Barbarossa in the east without waiting for victory in the west was not a fatal error, but only
an attempt to right the fatal error he had already made. But by then it was too late. Even the