Page 295 - The Chief Culprit

240 y e Chief Culprit

he asked: “But what for?” Hitler’s chief of staff, who planned the war, was wondering exactly
the same.
A blitzkrieg is a tank war. On September 1, 1939, Germany only had 2,977 tanks. 4
How did it happen that out of this number almost half (1,445 Pz-I tanks) had no cannon?
How come the other half (1,223 Pz-II tanks) had only pathetic 20-mm cannons? How come
they only had 98 Pz-III tanks with their useless 37-mm cannon, and only 211 Pz-IVs, which
had 75-mm short-barreled cannon, not designed and not useful for war against other tanks?
By June 1941, Hitler had in his invading army 3,332 tanks, all of them light and all
5
of them obsolete—not one single heavy tank. ere were medium ones, which were simply
light tanks covered with an extra layer of armor plates. eir defenses increased from this,
but their mobility decreased: their speed, maneuverability, and ability to pass through rough
terrain—all of which were necessary for maneuvers in large open spaces. Hitler didn’t have
a single amphibious tank, or one with anti-projectile armor, nor one with powerful cannon.
Stalin, on the other hand, had 23,925 tanks, including the best models in the world that had
the best tank-building innovations of the time: powerful long-barrel cannons, wide caterpil-
lar tracks, anti-tank defenses, diesel motors, and so on. Moreover, Stalin possessed almost
endless means for producing these tanks. Stalin had more amphibious tanks than Hitler had
tanks in total.
In addition to tanks, an army needed powerful tank formations. In Germany, tank divi-
sions were created. But these divisions, to put it mildly, were inferior. In 1939, Hitler had six
tank divisions. Germany entered World War II with six tank divisions! What sort of blitzkrieg
could one dream about having only six tank divisions?! And even today some continue to
claim that German generals understood the nature of blitzkrieg! In 1940, the number of tank
divisions rose to ten, and in 1941 to twenty-one. e increase in the number of tank divisions
was attained not by producing tanks, but by reassignment. In practice, the same number of
tanks was divided first into six divisions, then ten, then twenty-one.
Liddell Hart commented:

is doubling in number of armored forces turned out to be sheer illusion, since it was achieved
mostly at the expense of reducing the number of tanks in each division. . . . Some of the quali-
fied expert tankers attempted to argue against such a decision, since the result of such measures
was to multiply the number of staffs and secondary units in the so-called “tank divisions.”
. . . Out of 17,000 people in the division, only 2,600 were tankers. But Hitler was stub-
born. Seeing before him the vast Russian territory, he wanted to feel that he had more
divisions, capable of delivering blows deep into the land, and counted on technological
advantage over the Russians to serve as sufficient compensation for the “dilution” of his
tank troops. . . . However, cutting the number of tanks in the divisions increased the main
disadvantage of the German tank division—the fact that its units and subdivisions mostly
consisted of infantry, and could not move on difficult terrain. 6

Liddell Hart put the term German “tank division” in quotation marks. He explains his
point of view: “Tanks could continue an offensive, but they, just like all other track vehicles,
made up only a small part of each so-called “tank division.” 7
Tanks alone do not ensure strength. A lone tank that ventures far ahead is vulnerable.
A tank must be supported by infantry. “In 1941, the German army still consisted mostly