Page 298 - The Chief Culprit

A Blitzkrieg against Russia? y 243

In December 1940, when Hitler signed the directive for the attack on the Soviet Union,
it was perfectly clear that the light single- and dual-engine bombers had too small a radius
and too pathetic a bomb load, and were not fit for destroying industrial targets. At the same
time, German bombers were flying from the excellent air bases in northern France, across
the Channel, and bombing the industrial and military targets of London, Bristol, Coventry,
Plymouth, and Southampton. Supplying fuel and ammunition from Germany to the airports
of northern France was no problem. e targets were nearby, just across the Channel, and
the planes could take less fuel and more bombs. Nonetheless, even in these most favorable
circumstances, in nine months of intense bombing raids, from August 12, 1940, to May 12,
1941, all of Germany’s aviation was still unable to “bomb British industry out of the war.” If
the entire German aviation could not in nine months destroy the industry of nearby Britain,
how many months did Hitler plan to spend trying to destroy the industry centers of the
remote Urals?
To destroy industrial regions situated in the deep rear of the enemy, an aggressor needs
long-range bombers with a radius of action of several thousand kilometers and a bomb-car-
rying capacity of over five tons. e long-range bomber must also be a high-altitude bomber,
otherwise it would be vulnerable to the enemy’s anti-aircraft artillery. Also, is necessary a
minimum of one thousand such bombers. Hitler had none. Even if Hitler had had long-
range bombers, it would still have been impossible to use them. A four-engine bomber,
carrying five tons of bombs at a multi-kilometer altitude for several thousands of kilometers,
was extremely fuel-thirsty. Where would the fuel come from, if there was not enough even
for fighters and light bombers?