Page 300 - The Chief Culprit

Intelligence Reports and Stalin’s Reaction y 245

Hitler at receptions. en, in 1945, the popular ird Reich actress was befriended by Stalin
and given the highest Soviet marks of distinction.
Stalin’s espionage stretched far beyond the borders of the great powers. e Bulgarian
Tsar Boris had an advisor, General Konstantin Lukash. Before each meeting with the tsar,
the general prepared to answer any question the tsar could ask him. During the course of
the preparations, Luben Lukash, the general’s brother, played the role of the tsar, and asked
the tsar’s advisor the trickiest questions. e general had to answer quickly and precisely. As
a result, the younger brother was just as informed as the tsar. He worked for the GRU, and
asked his brother—the tsar’s advisor—questions that interested Stalin. 4
After World War I, Czechoslovakia was among the ten wealthiest and most developed
nations in the world. e Skoda factories produced weapons of the highest world standards,
primarily artillery. e daughter of the factory director, Blanca Karlikova, managed to sneak
out blueprints of the 210-mm cannon and transfer them to the right person. She worked for
the same group of agents that was working against the Bulgarian tsar. 5
Testimonies about the might of Stalin’s espionage abound. For example, Air Force
Major General P. M. Stefanovsky recounted, as if it were something utterly insignificant, that
in July 1941 he was summoned by Stalin and told: “In three days, the Germans will bomb
6
Moscow.” Stefanovsky described the measures that were taken, and in three days the first
massive air raid on Moscow was deflected. But we can pause on this seemingly insignificant
episode. How could Stalin have known that in precisely three days the Germans would bomb
Moscow? e pilots at the air bases did not know what they would be doing the following
day. It was always a secret. e success of the upcoming operation, the lives and safety of
the pilots, depended on that secret. A very small group of people knew the plans for air war.
Commanders of formations and pilots found out the targets they had to bomb only at the
last moment. Yet Stalin knew not only what the German pilots would be doing the following
day, but also what they would be doing in three days.
Anastas Mikoyan, member of the Politburo, also recounted an instance that demon-
strated the extraordinary capabilities of Stalin’s intelligence services. On March 27, 1943, at
around two o’clock in the morning, Mikoyan was summoned to Stalin’s dacha in Volynskoe.
Stalin told him what the German command was planning for the summer of 1943. e
7
Battle of Stalingrad had just ended. e Red Army made a thrust forward, but was stopped
in the regions around Kharkov, Orel, and Belgorod. A balance of powers set in. Neither one
of the sides could advance. Both sides switched to defense, and began intensive preparations
for the summer battle that would unfold in these regions in another four months. e Battle
of Kursk would be one of the bloodiest battles in human history. It began on July 5, 1943.
But German generals began roughly planning the operation on March 13, 1943; on March
27, Stalin announced this fact to Mikoyan and ordered the secret preparation of the strategic
reserve of the Steppe military district, consisting of eight armies, including one air and one
tank guards army, for a defensive battle and for the following offensive operations. e Steppe
military district was deployed behind the main alignment of Soviet troops, and at the critical
moment of the battle it was transformed into the Steppe front.
Stalin was constantly peeking at Hitler’s cards. During the development of German op-
erations in the Kursk region, all details and all changes in the plan were immediately reported
to Stalin. Before the beginning of the operation, German generals, who were the immediate