Page 303 - The Chief Culprit
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248  y   e Chief Culprit


                      In December 1940, Lieutenant General F. I. Golikov, chief of the GRU, reported to
                 Stalin that, according to confirmed reports, Hitler had decided to attack the Soviet Union
                 without waiting for the war in the west to end.  is highly important document was discussed
                 in early January in a very close circle in the Soviet High Command in Stalin’s presence. Stalin
                 did not believe the document, and said that any document could be forged. Stalin demanded
                 of Golikov that he organize Soviet military intelligence so that it would know at any moment
                 whether Hitler was really preparing for war or just bluffing. Golikov reported that he had
                 already done this.  e GRU was attentively following a whole range of aspects of German
                 military preparations, and from these the GRU would accurately identify the moment when
                 preparations for invasion would begin. Stalin asked Golikov to explain how he would know
                 this. Golikov answered that he could only tell Stalin personally and not anyone else.
                      Subsequently, Golikov regularly reported to Stalin personally, and each time he told
                 him that the preparations for invasion had not yet begun. Golikov knew about the massive
                 concentration of German troops on Soviet borders, about the huge ammunition supplies,
                 about the movements of the German air force, about German defectors, and about many
                 other things. He was informed about the numbers of nearly all German divisions, the names
                 of their commanders, and their locations. He knew many important secrets, including the
                 name of Operation Barbarossa and the time of its inception. Even on the eve of the invasion,
                 however, Golikov reported that preparations for invasion had not yet begun, and without
                 these preparations it was not possible for Germany to begin the war.
                      When the war broke out, Stalin sent Golikov on a trip to Britain and the United States
                 and briefed him personally. Golikov was then put in command of armies and fronts. In 1943,
                 Stalin appointed him to the crucial post of Deputy People’s Commissar for Defense, which
                 was deputy to Stalin himself, to deal with cadre matters. Stalin allowed only his most trusted
                 men to handle the delicate task of selecting and placing cadres. Golikov continued to rise in
                 rank after Stalin’s death, and eventually became a Marshal of the Soviet Union.
                      Golikov’s impunity for obviously wrong intelligence had been worrying me personally
                 for a long time, until I attended a lecture in the Academy of the GRU. Later, when I was
                 working in the central apparatus of the GRU, I found confirmation to this answer.
                      Golikov used to report to Stalin that Hitler was not preparing for war against the Soviet
                 Union. It turned out that Golikov was reporting the truth to Stalin, since Hitler was not
                 making such preparations. Golikov knew that Stalin did not trust documents. Golikov did
                 not trust them either. He therefore looked for other indicators which would unerringly signal
                 the moment when Hitler began his preparations for war with the Soviet Union.
                      All GRU agents in Europe were ordered to infiltrate organizations directly or indirectly
                 connected with sheep farming. Over a few months, intelligence was gathered and carefully
                 processed on the number of sheep in Europe, on the main sheep-breeding centers and slaugh-
                 terhouses. Golikov was informed twice a day about mutton prices in Europe. In addition,
                 Soviet intelligence began to hunt for dirty cloths and oil-stained pieces of paper left behind
                 by soldiers cleaning their weapons.  ere were many German troops in Europe.  e troops
                 were stationed in field conditions. Each soldier cleaned his weapon at least once a day. Cloths
                 and paper which have been used for weapon cleaning were usually either burned or buried,
                 but of course this rule was not always obeyed.  e GRU had ample opportunity to collect an
                 enormous quantity of dirty cloths. A large number of these dirty cloths were sent across the
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