Page 310 - The Chief Culprit

e War Has Begun y 255

the German air force had not been destroyed in a surprise raid but, on the contrary, the entire
Soviet Western Front had lost 738 planes during the first hours of the war, advancing was not
at all the best option. e Western Front, its command, staff, the army commanders and the
chiefs of their staffs knew long before the war that their primary objective was the encircle-
ment of the German formations in the vicinity of Suvalki. A Soviet attack on Suvalki had been
prepared long before the war. e objective had been identified by all Soviet commanders.
Of course, the lower-ranking commanders had no right to know the tactical levels of these
objectives, but in the higher staffs they were clearly formulated, sealed in secret envelopes and
kept in safes in all headquarters, even those of the battalions. For example, the reconnaissance
battalion of the 27th Rifle Division, concentrated along the border near the city of Augustow,
was getting ready to deploy reconnaissance forces around Suvalki. Its objective was to secure
13
a rapid advance of the entire 27th Rifle Division from Augustow on Suvalki.
Long before the war, huge masses of Soviet troops were gathered in the regions around
Augustow. Here, on Soviet territory, the Augustow canal stretched parallel to and right along
the border. If the plans had been made for defense, the troops should have been positioned
behind the canal, so they could use it as an obstacle, an anti-tank trench. But the Soviet
troops were shipped across the canal to its western shores and positioned on a thin strip of
land between the canal and the border from which barbwire had already been removed. At
dawn on June 22, thousands of Soviet soldiers were killed here by sudden and lethal enemy
fire. With the canal behind them, the troops had nowhere to retreat.
e German troops on the other side of the border were also gathered in huge masses
right along the border, and had also taken down the barbwire. If the Red Army had attacked
a day earlier, the losses on the other side would have been just as great. e positioning of
troops right along the border was extremely dangerous if the enemy attacked suddenly. But
such a positioning was extremely convenient for carrying out a sudden attack.
Soviet generals never concealed the fact that strictly offensive objectives were set before
them. General K. Galitsky, when talking about the concentration of Soviet troops in the
Augustow region, stressed that the Soviet command did not believe in the possibility of a Ger-
man attack, while the Soviet troops were being prepared to conduct an offensive operation.
e Soviet fronts directed against Eastern Prussia and Poland, as well as the fronts
positioned against Romania and Hungary, were preparing strictly for an offensive. Major
General A. I. Mikhalev acknowledged that the Soviet command did not plan to use the
Southern and Southwestern fronts for defensive or counteroffensive actions. “ e strategic
goals were planned to be attained through the troops’ switching to a decisively offensive
course of action.”
14
e actions of the Red Army during the first days of the war speak best about Soviet
intentions. General Zhukov coordinated the actions of the Southern and Southwestern fronts
during the first days of the war, which were aimed at Romania and Hungary. Up until June
30, 1941, Zhukov insisted on advance and demanded that the commanders of the fronts
exclusively attack. It was only in July that he and his colleagues concluded that the armies
could no longer attack.
It is interesting to look at the Red Army’s preparations for war through the eyes of
those who were posted right on the border, especially on the Romanian border, because
the most significant assault was supposed to take place there. Many books have been writ-
ten about that time period. In June 1941, Hero of the Soviet Union Major General A.