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e War Has Begun y 257

small groups of demolition experts and sappers. But the 164th Division (like all the others)
was preparing for an invasion, so it crossed the Dniester, carrying with it hundreds of tons
of ammunition, fuel, and supplies, as well as its headquarters, hospitals, and communication
units, and stopped at the last border—the river Prut. ere were 15,000 soldiers in the divi-
sion, many cannon, many shells, and many cars. ere were other divisions nearby, and all
of them were between the two rivers—the Dniester was behind them, and the border river
Prut ahead.
e Germans attacked, took over the bridge across the border river—the bridge was
not mined—and began to send their units across. ey bombed the bridges behind the
Soviet divisions. To the north of this strip, the German 1st Tank Group broke through and
encircled the Soviet front, cutting the Soviet troops off from their rears. e Soviet divisions
were trapped. Masses of people and weapons (the 96th Mountain Rifle Division, 13,000
men strong, was also there) were in this trap. Nobody had prepared defenses, dug trenches or
foxholes. Retreat was impossible—the Dniester was behind them, with no remaining bridges.
A massacre followed.
Sviridov looked across the river Prut to the border bridge, and saw unending streams of
German troops move across it. He remembered: “ e bridge! We kept it in order to advance,
and now we can’t blow it up. . . . All my military training was mostly done under the motto:
only advance! Retreat was considered shameful, and we were not taught how to retreat. Now,
when we were forced to retreat, we had no experience. We had to learn this art under terrible
enemy fire.”
During the war, especially in the beginning, the Red Army suffered many defeats. In
August and September of 1941, a military catastrophe of historical proportions occurred in
the region around Kiev: 665,000 Soviet troops were encircled and captured by the German
army. Near Smolensk, 310,000 Soviet soldiers and officers were surrounded. In 1942 on the
Crimean front: Soviet troops were encircled near Khar’kov; the 2nd Shock Army, headed by
General Vlasov, was surrounded and exterminated.
is kind of information was considered classified. Soviet historians and generals never
wrote about these events. But there was an exception to the rule: June 22, 1941. e Soviet pro-
paganda described without mercy everything related to that day, and denounced the Red Army
before the entire world. Why was it allowed to talk about the lack of readiness for war?
In the library of the Military-Diplomatic Academy of the Soviet Army, I stumbled
across a very small book. It was titled A Brief Russian-German Military Phrase Book for Soldiers
and Junior Commanders. e booklet was published in Moscow on May 29, 1941, and ad-
ditionally on June 5 the same booklet was published in Leningrad, Minsk, and Kiev. In total,
five million copies were printed. In all Soviet books, including military textbooks, the price
was on the last page. e price was not printed only on those books and instructions that
related to the conduct of battle. ese publications were treated like ammunition, and were
handed out to the troops during training exercises, and, when necessary, before and during
battle. No price was stamped on the little book I found. It was a battle document; it proved
that the USSR was preparing for the war with Germany.
e phrase book was composed very simply and intelligently: a question in Russian,
followed by the same question in German written in Russian letters, then in German in Latin
letters. e answers were also printed in Russian and German with Latin and Cyrillic letters.
It is quite simple to speak according to the booklet—if you do not know how to pronounce