Page 332 - The Chief Culprit

A Model War y 277

army had carried out an attack, the disaster of June 1941 would have been repeated in the Far
East at the end of July or the beginning of August 1945.
ousands of Soviet tanks without crews, as well as thousands of airplanes without
pilots in the fields, were left right on the borders. e border forests were full of piles of
shells, the railroad stations with trains of fuel and ammunition. If the Japanese had attacked,
they would have seized all these resources, while the Red Army would have been left without
ammunition or fuel. ousands of soldiers from the railroad troops were ready to change
the Japanese tracks to the Soviet standards, but they were not prepared to blow up their own
bridges and tunnels. If they had attacked, the Japanese armies could have used Soviet bridges
and tunnels. Soviet artillery had advanced right up to the border, but was not protected by
infantry. For the purpose of surprise, the tanks and infantry would advance to the border
only at the very last moment. If they had attacked, the Japanese could have taken thousands
of Soviet cannon and howitzers, millions of shells which were already piled on the ground,
and the Red Army would have been left without artillery, just like in 1941. e Red Army’s
command posts and communication lines were also located right at the borders. In the event
of a surprise Japanese attack, the Red Army would have been left without command or
communication—in other words, without a head or a nervous system.
On Stalin’s orders, the command and staff of the Karelian Front, with Marshal
Meretskov in command, was transferred to the Far East. e choice fell on them because
the Karelian Front had tremendous experience in breaking through long-term fortified re-
gions. is was exactly the work they were to do in Manchuria. e 5th Army, transferred
from Eastern Prussia, was chosen for the same reason. is army also had rich experience in
breaking through fortifications. At the same time, Soviet troops designated for the defense of
fortified regions left their concrete fortifications and prepared to cross the border. e situa-
tion was extremely favorable for a Japanese invasion: the Red Army was preparing for attack,
but it was not preparing for defense. It left all its fortified regions without troops. Hundreds
of thousands of Red Army soldiers and officers were in trains, not knowing where they were
being taken and what they were supposed to do.
Arriving Soviet troops were formed into tight assault formations, which made great
targets for the Japanese air force. e bare areas between the attack formations were two
hundred kilometers or more. e Japanese would not even have to breach Soviet defenses in
these locations, because there were none there. Most importantly, the Soviet troops had no
plans for defense in the Far East in the summer of 1945. Invasion plans were relayed to the
troops at the very last moment. If the Japanese troops had carried out a surprise attack before
August 9, 1945, Soviet troops would have suffered almost the same losses as Soviet troops in
the summer of 1941 on the German border. And we would now be laughing at the stupidity
of Soviet marshals, who ordered soldiers to harvest the hay in the fortified regions and sent
officers to rest homes and sanatoriums. But the Japanese did not attack, since they never
planned to attack the USSR, at least not in 1945.