Page 327 - The Chief Culprit

272 y e Chief Culprit

squads of the fortified regions worked in the fields harvesting hay in all the areas visible to
the enemy. e officers went to the local resorts and sanatoriums during their leave. e
enemy was also confused by the fact that the local population from the border territories was
not relocated, and their daily life was not affected by any changes. Training exercises were
conducted at the same time as the troop movements, so the local population took everything
they saw for regular military drills. 36
e core principle of strategy is the concentration of force against weakness. e most
powerful Soviet formation, the Trans-Baikal Front, was deployed against the weakest area of
the Japanese defenses. But even here the forces were not spread out evenly along the entire
border. Instead, extremely powerful assault groups gathered. Between these groups remained
significant gaps, which were not covered by any troops. For example, on the Trans-Baikal
Front, there was a gap of two hundred kilometers between the 17th Army and the 6th Tank
Guards Army. Long before World War II, there was a chain of fortified regions erected
37
along the border in the Far East. ese regions housed a significant number of troops that
were specially trained for conducting long defense operations. But in the summer of 1945,
Japan found itself on the verge of defeat. erefore, the Soviet troops stationed in the forti-
fied regions were issued orders to leave their armored concrete fortifications and reinforce the
assault formations. 38
On August 6, 1945, the American air force dropped an atomic bomb over Hiroshima,
and on August 9, over Nagasaki. Japan was on its deathbed. And at this moment, on August
9, 1945, the Red Army carried out its sudden and crushing attack against Japanese troops
in Manchuria and China. e operations of all the armies were planned according to the
principle of surprise attack and overpowering the enemy with the immediate use of gigantic
force. Even in secondary locations, the actions immediately took on an active and maneuver-
ing character. On August 8, the Soviet government declared: “ is kind of action is the only
39
measure capable of speeding up the coming of peace, to save people from further suffering
and misery, and give the Japanese people the opportunity to rid themselves of danger and
destruction.” 40
In the evening of August 8, 1945, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow was notified of a
Soviet statement, which read: “Starting the next day, August 9, the Soviet Union will consider it-
self in a state of war with Japan.” On August 9, the Soviet armies carried out their surprise attack.
41
One could ask: How was it possible to declare the war on August 8 and to deliver a sudden strike
on August 9? e answer is that in Vladivostok the day begins seven hours earlier than in Moscow.
42
Military actions began on August 9 at 12:10  Vladivostok time. At that moment in Moscow,
it was still 5:10  on August 8. No one had yet warned the Japanese ambassador. en, when
night fell in Moscow, the Japanese ambassador was summoned to the People’s Commissariat
of Foreign Affairs and at 11:50  Moscow time, it was announced that a war would begin
on the following day. In Moscow, there were still 10 minutes left until the next day, but in the
Far East the new day had long since begun. At the time of the announcement, it was already
6:50 . War had been going on for over six hours. e most important events had already
happened: a sudden Soviet air raid destroyed the Japanese air bases, the border defenses were
liquidated, and powerful tank formations entered Manchuria and China, continuing an un-
stoppable thrust forward.
e Japanese ambassador in Moscow was told about the beginning of the war, but
he still had to reach the embassy and communicate with his government. All the telephone