Page 322 - The Chief Culprit

A Model War y 267

a great sensation. For Germany, this was quite an unpleasant sensation. “ e signing of the
4
Soviet-Japanese neutrality agreement was a great surprise for Germany. Ribbentrop ordered the
German ambassador in Tokyo to demand an explanation from the Japanese government.” An
5
explanation was provided. Matsuoka told the German ambassador in Tokyo that “if Germany
and the Soviet Union were to start fighting, not a single Japanese premier or minister of for-
eign affairs could keep the nation neutral. Japan will ally with Germany in attacking Russia,
whatever the situation. Pacts of neutrality do not matter in this affair.” But this intent never
6
materialized. Japan didn’t attack the Soviet Union.
On April 13, 1941, right after the signing of the agreement between Japan and the
USSR, Matsuoka headed for the train station in Moscow, on his way to Tokyo. According to
protocol, many officials accompanied him. Suddenly, the rules of protocol were broken. At
the last minute before the train left, Stalin appeared on the platform. He usually never met
anyone or saw anyone off. On that day, Stalin was in a remarkably good mood. Obviously,
the train departure was delayed. Stalin laughed and joked. He walked with the Japanese min-
ister right to the steps of the railcar, and here he did something entirely uncharacteristic for
him—he embraced the Japanese minister and proclaimed that the Soviet Union and Japan
would remain friends forever. Among those seeing off the Japanese minister was the German
military attaché—Stalin noticed and also embraced him, declaring that Germany and the
Soviet Union would also remain friends. Stalin’s behavior was very uncommon. He was usu-
ally very discreet. He never embraced anyone in the presence of outsiders. Many historians
explained this unusual behavior as Stalin’s commitment to peace, as proof that he attempted
to avoid war with Japan and Germany at any cost.
Exactly ten weeks later, on June 22, 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union. Soon,
Stalin found himself on the brink of defeat. At this critical moment, the Japanese government
kept its word to the Soviets and remained neutral. In that same year, 1941, Japan attacked the
U.S. Navy at Pearl Harbor, triggering the war between the United States and Japan. is was
advantageous for Stalin, and despite the signed pact, he started secret preparations to attack
Japan. “ ey did not know Stalin well in Tokyo,” wrote one observer. “If the Japanese had
at least superficially acquainted themselves with the lifestyle and career path of the great fol-
lower of Lenin’s legacy, they would have noticed that his methods always remained the same:
make an alliance with somebody against somebody else, and follow it with a stab in the back
to the ally once he becomes useless.” 7
Stalin kept his intentions secret until the right time, but in the beginning of 1943 he
told the American president about his decision to attack Japan. Stalin had planned his sudden
attack on Japan not for 1943, when America was engaged in a difficult war and needed help,
but at the very last moments of the war, when Japan would be already on the verge of defeat.
Stalin could have helped the United States much earlier. He had the capacity to drastically
quicken Japan’s defeat. e United States had a very powerful strategic air force, but they
had to fly to Japan across the largest ocean in the world, and then fly back without refueling.
Raids on Japan could also be carried out from islands in the Pacific Ocean, but these islands
had to be taken first, and therefore it was first necessary to achieve naval domination. And
even after taking the islands, the Americans still had to fly several thousand kilometers to
their targets and back. Each plane had to carry a large amount of fuel and an insignificant
number of bombs. e Soviet Union, on the other hand, was right next to Japan.