Page 323 - The Chief Culprit

268 y e Chief Culprit

“Cordell Hill, the American Secretary of State, tried to obtain from Moscow permis-
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sion for the American air force to use Soviet military airbases in the Far East.” Stalin firmly
refused. President Roosevelt sent messages to Stalin on December 30, 1942, and January 8,
1943, urging the Russian leader to allow American air force units to be stationed on bases in
the Soviet Far East. Stalin answered the messages with an uncompromising “no.” 9
If Stalin had given the Americans the opportunity to use Soviet air bases, instead of
making long flights to Japan from the faraway islands, every plane could have completed
several short flights with a large load of bombs. In that case, the American raids on Japanese
targets would have been considerably more effective. But it was in Stalin’s interest that the war
between Japan and the United States be stretched as long as possible.
By the way, Stalin allowed America to use several Soviet air bases in the Poltava re-
gion for bombing Germany. American B-17 strategic bombers took off from the airfields at
Poltava and flew to bomb Germany. eir takeoffs were covered by Soviet fighters, which
accompanied them to the length of their radius of action. At the same time, other waves
of American bombers flew out of Britain. Having dropped bombs on German cities and
factories, these bombers landed on the airfields at Poltava. ey were met by Soviet fighters,
which covered them during landing. But Stalin did not give permission to use the air bases
in Nakhodka and Petropavlovsk for bombing Japan. Stalin waited for a complete depletion
of Japanese forces in a prolonged war, and prepared his own attack. As Japan weakened,
Stalin strengthened the preparation for a war against it. Stalin called Japan an aggressor for
the first time on November 6, 1944. On April 5, 1945, the USSR leadership cancelled the
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Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact.
In the summer of 1944, Stalin told Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky that he would be the chief
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commander of Soviet troops in a war against Japan. e initial figures of the concentration
of our troops in the Amur, Pacific Coast, and Trans-Baikal regions were sketched out in the
fall of 1944. At the same time, rough calculations of the resources needed for a war in the Far
East were made.
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Vasilevsky was one of the most talented commanders in the history of the Soviet Union.
His talent became apparent during the war. In 1940, he was given the rank of major general.
“[As] deputy chief of the Operations branch of the General Staff, he worked on the opera-
tional section of planning the strategic deployment of Soviet armed forces on the Northern,
Northwestern, and Western Fronts.”
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A month after the beginning of the German invasion, Stalin appointed Vasilevsky as
chief of the General Staff’s Operations Directorate. Vasilevsky was responsible now not just
for a separate (although the most important) sector of the front, but for all the plans of the
war on all fronts. Two months later, Stalin promoted Vasilevsky to lieutenant general. Half a
year later, Vasilevsky became colonel general. One month later, Vasilevsky received yet anoth-
er promotion: Stalin named him chief of the General Staff, the central brain of the Red Army,
and entrusted to him the preparations for offensive operations in the Stalingrad region. In
October 1942, Colonel General Vasilevsky became Stalin’s deputy. According to Vasilevsky’s
plans, all command and communications posts in the Stalingrad region were moved to
the very front lines. He also moved there all air bases, hospitals, huge supplies of shells,
cartridges, fuel, and lubricants. Until the very last moment, Soviet troops did not know
anything about what they were going to do. By keeping his offensive preparations secret from
his own troops, Vasilevsky managed to keep them secret from the enemy as well. And then, a