Page 326 - The Chief Culprit

A Model War y 271

and fuel for all Soviet troop formations. “An agreement was reached with the United States
about the concentration of three months’ supplies and fuels for our troops in this theater of
military operations.” e United States also supplied airplanes, armored cars, automobiles,
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radios, telephone cables, medicines, optical devices, and much more.
Stalin gave instructions to the commander-in-chief in the Far East, Marshal Vasilevsky,
and to the other front commanders back in Moscow. ere were very few documents about
the preparations for a surprise attack on Japan: one notebook with calculations and one map.
ese documents remained in the Kremlin. Marshals and generals had to remember their
objectives without using any papers. Upon arrival in the Far East, the front commanders
began detailed planning and calculations. “A strictly limited number of people were allowed
to see the drafting of plans for the fronts. Only the commander, the member of the military
council, the chief of staff, and the chief of the operations directorate of the front knew the
plans in full.”
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e Trans-Baikal Front was deployed in a territory stretching 2,300 kilometers, and it
was supposed to carry out a surprise attack eight hundred kilometers deep into enemy ter-
ritory. ere were 648,000 troops, 2,359 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1,324 warplanes,
9,668 guns and mortars, and 369 salvo-fire field installations (“Katyusha”). Four men, with-
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out secretaries, draftsmen, or other personnel, did all the planning of military operations for
this mass of troops.
e 1st Far Eastern Front had 589,000 troops, 11,430 guns and mortars, 274 salvo-
fire field installations, 1,974 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 1,137 combat planes. All the
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planning on this front was also done by just four men.
e Trans-Baikal and the 1st Far Eastern Fronts were to attack in converging directions.
Between these two attack formations there was the relatively weaker 2nd Far Eastern Front,
which had 333,000 troops, 5,988 guns and mortars, 72 salvo-fire field installations, 917
tanks and self-propelled guns, and 1,260 combat planes. A classic encirclement operation
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was being prepared, with a relatively weak middle and two extremely powerful flank forma-
tions. e newness lay in the size of the operation. All three fronts were meant to advance si-
multaneously along the front line of 5,130 kilometers. Such an operation was unprecedented.
(Let’s hope that it will never again be repeated.)
Stalin issued a special directive, which required the front commanders to define the
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objectives to the armies verbally, without producing any written documents. After receiv-
ing an objective, the army commanders were to commence the planning of the operation.
General M. Gareev was at that time a major in the operational staff sector of the 5th Army
of the 1st Far Eastern Front: “Near the station Muchnaya, we were shut in a separate, heavily
guarded house, [from] which no one was allowed outside. Guards brought in food. We had
to work almost around the clock. Exchanging letters with questions regarding the operation
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preparations was forbidden, even in code. e army commanders described the objectives
to the division commanders verbally, using only a map. Radios only received signals. In the
artillery units, communication by radio was permitted only after the beginning of artillery
softening-up, and in the other units after the beginning of the attack. 34
e unloading of arriving troops and all troop movements took place during the night.
e arriving troops were immediately sent to special areas, where hiding places had been
prepared in advance. Before beginning the offensive, the main forces were to be kept back,
and part of the artillery was to move closer to the border and be ready to open fire. Special
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