Page 364 - The Chief Culprit

Notes to Pages 224–240 y 309

11. Voyna I Revolutsia [War and Revolution], no. 8 (1931): 11.
12. e Rear of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War, 1941–1945, 33.
13. VIZh, no. 12 (1972): 46
14. VIZh, no. 10 (1971): 13.
15. Ivanov, e Early Stage of the War, 206.
16. S. A. Kalinin, Reflections on the Past (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1963), 124.
17. VIZh, no. 7 (1979): 43.
18. Stalin, Collected Works, 5: 225.
19. F. A. Kalinin, oughts about the Past (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1963), 182.
20. e ChK (Chrezvychainaia Comissia, or Extraordinary Commission) was a precursor of the NKVD.
“Chekist” to this day means a member of the political police.
Chapter 37
Epigraph: Liddell Hart, Strategy: e Indirect Approach, 336.
1. Krasnaya Zvezda, October 27, 1992.
2. Makhmut Gareev, in the collection of articles titled Courage (Moscow, 1991), 253.
3. Krasnaya Zvezda, July 27, 1991.

Chapter 38
Epigraph: F. Chuev, Molotov, 48.
1. Nikolai G. Kuznetsov, On the Eve of . . . (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1966), 321.
2. Peter Chamberlain and Chris Ellis, British and American Tanks of World War II (New York: ARCO,
1969), 66.
3. Winston Churchill, e Second World War (Moscow: Terra, 1998), 3: 80. e losses of the British
merchant and navy fleets (in imperial tons, where 1 imperial ton is equal to 1.016 metric ton) were as
follows: January—320,000, February—402,000, March —537,000, April—654,000, May—500,000,
June—431,000.
4. Foreign Affairs Documents, 1940–22 June 1941, 21: 2: 739. A warning about a possible German at-
tack came from the British government only on June 16, 1941. British ambassador Cripps was not in
Moscow and the warning about the possible German invasion was handed to the Soviet ambassador in
London, Maisky, who immediately transmitted the message to Molotov in Moscow. Here is the begin-
ning of this quite long message: “Today, Cadogan, upon Eden’s directive, provided me with more de-
tailed information about the concentration of German troops at the Soviet border. . . . Total number of
German troops presently concentrated at the Soviet borders, according to British General Headquarters
data, is eighty divisions in Poland, thirty in Romania, and five in Finland and northern Norway, total
115 divisions, not counting the mobilized Romanian army.” Further on, there was a detailed descrip-
tion of which German troops were at the border, and when and where they went. One notices the
outstanding work of British intelligence, which reported absolutely precise data about the German
invasion army. Now we know that by June 22, 1941, 125 divisions and two brigades were deployed
in the first strategic echelon of the German invading army, in other words, along the Soviet borders.
By mid-June, most likely, there were 115 divisions, as the message reported. Stalin did not believe this
message, since all previous messages gave him reasons for doubt. Most importantly, however, Stalin, at
that time, had his own plans for Germany.
5. Liddell Hart, e Second World War, 151.
6. L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1971–76), 611.
Chapter 39
Epigraph: Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, part 1, chapter VII, 164.
1. Soviet Military Encyclopedia, 5: 343.
2. Halder, War Diary, 2.
3. Ibid.
4. Muller-Hillebrand, German Ground Forces, 1933–1945, 2: 144.