Page 361 - The Chief Culprit

306 y Notes to Pages 196–206

Chapter 32
Epigraph: Voennyi Vestnik, no. 4 (1940): 76–77.
1. Meltiukhov, Stalin’s Missed Opportunity, 535.
2. VIZh.
3. VIZh, no. 10 (1972): 83.
4. Meltiukhov, Stalin’s Missed Opportunity.
5. In accordance with Soviet military theory, a special designation was assigned to the armies that were re-
inforced and intended for rapid advance in the main strategic direction. is designation only appeared
in Soviet military nomenclature in 1930 and was internal. In 1941, the designation became open and
was used in identifying armies. Although the 9th Army was not officially called “Shock,” it was equally
equipped, staffed, and trained to qualify as a “shock” army. See note for chapter 21.
6. On September 16, 1939, the Cavalry Army Group of the Kiev Special Military District (under the
command of II-degree Komandarm I. V. Tiulenev) was renamed the Kamenets-Podolsk Group; on
September 20 it was rechristened as the Southern Group, and starting September 24 it became the 12th
Army.
7. Soviet Military Encyclopedia, 8: 181.
8. Marshal I. Bagramian, VIZh, no. 1 (1967): 54.
9. Zhukov, Memoirs and Reflections, 224.
10. e Year 1941, 2: 104–6. e Central Committee of the VKP (b) and the Council of People’s
Commissars Decree, “Regarding creation of new units of the Red Army # 1112-459cc” of April 23,
1941, Paragraph 2-B: “Convert 10 Rifle Divisions into Mountain Rifle Divisions.”
11. Krasnaya Zvezda, November 1, 1986.
12. See for example Lieutenant-General Bagrat Arushunyan, VIZh, no. 6 (1973): 61.
13. VIZh, no. 1 (1976): 55.

Chapter 33
Epigraph: Soviet-Nazi Relations, 1939: Documents and Materials on the Soviet-German Relations in April–
September 1939 (Paris and New York: Tretia Volna, 1983), 326.
1. Stalin’s Politburo in the 1930s: A Collection of Documents (Moscow: AIRO-XX, 1995), Document #17;
Izvestia, May 7, 1941. Until recently it was widely assumed that it happened on May 6, when the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued a decree regarding the appointment of Joseph I.
Stalin as the Chairman of the People’s Commissars Council. However, the appropriate decision of the
Politburo of the Central Committee of the VKP (b) was made on May 4. Stalin’s appointment as the
Chief of Government was justified in this top-secret decision by the “tense present-day international
situation.” In the non-classified section of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Decree concerning Stalin’s
appointment there was no justification for it—Stalin simply filled a vacant position. According to the
Presidium’s Decree, Molotov was relieved of his duty as chairman of the People’s Commissars Council
because he repeatedly complained about the difficulty of combining two positions—that of the Chief
of Government and the Foreign Affairs People’s Commissar.
2. VIZh, no. 9 (1965): 66.
3. A. Avtorkhanov, e Mystery of Stalin’s Death (Frankfurt: Possev, 1976), 132.
4. I. Bagramian, is Is How the War Began (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1971), 62. e explanation offered by
Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan Bagramian completely matches the opinion of Soviet historians: “In
May the international situation remained tense. e Soviet Union was preparing to rebut. is is exactly
how we in the military district HQ had interpreted Stalin’s appointment as the Chairman of the People’s
Commissars Council.
5. Pravda, May 6, 1941.
6. Russian Center for Storing and Studying Documents of Recent History, Fund 558, Index 1, Document
3808, Sheet 12.
7. Eduard Muratov, Six Hours with Stalin at a Reception in the Kremlin (St. Petersburg: Neva), no. 7
(1993): 285.
8. Stalin, report from March 10, 1939, at the Eighteenth Communist Party Congress.
9. Pravda, September 18, 1939.