Page 356 - The Chief Culprit

Notes to Pages 128–137 y 301

German V-III design, and the S-class is based on the German VII-class design. Sergei Gorlov, Top
Secret: e Moscow-Berlin Alliance, 1923–1933 (Moscow: Olma-Press, 2001), 264. In the opinion of
the Soviet scientist S. A. Gorlov: “It is, of course, difficult to imagine that Soviet shipbuilding, from
which in German professional opinion ‘nothing could be learned,’ all of a sudden could develop several
promising types of submarines. Even though such ship designers as B. M. Malinin, A. N. Krylov, V.
P. Kostenko, and others were naturally gifted talents, it is doubtful that they would have ignored such
outstanding completed designs and other specific German assistance.”
3. A. B. Shirokorad, Ships and Cutters of the USSR Navy, 1939–1945 (catalog) (Minsk: Harvest, 2002),
241. e following details are of interest: the construction of the ship commenced on January 11, 1937,
in Livorno—in other words, at a time when Soviet and Italian “volunteers” were killing each other in
Spain. e acceptance act was signed on April 18, 1939, after the unarmed ship, camouflaged as a mer-
chant vessel and manned by an Italian crew, departed for Odessa, where it arrived on May 5, 1939.
4. M. M. Kirian, ed., Military-Technological Progress and the USSR Armed Forces (Moscow: Voyenizdat,
1982), 189.
5. e Great Patriotic War, 1941–1945: Encyclopedia, 409.
6. History of the Second World War, 1939–1945, 2: 190.
7. VIZh, no. 5 (1980): 71.
8. N. A. Voznessensky, War Economics of the USSR during the Period of the Great Patriotic War (Moscow:
Gospolitizdat, 1947), 42.
9. Muller-Hillebrand, German Ground Forces, 1933–1945.
10. Ibid., 1: 161.
11. Ibid., 3: 50–51.
12. Several armies that were created for the purpose of attack were officially called “shock” armies from
1942. But the term was unofficially used from the mid-1920s in Soviet military theoretical works. ese
armies were better equipped than the ordinary ones.
13. Boris V. Sokolov, e Cost of Victory (Great Patriotic: e Unknown About the Known) (Moscow:
Moskovskiy Rabochiy, 1991), 64–66. e losses of explosives and ammunition production capacities
were exceptionally high, one could even say catastrophic. e Soviet Union could not fight Hitler with
the remaining 15 percent capacity. at is why, from the beginning of the talks on the Lend-Lease
supplies, Stalin and his representatives were asking first of all for the explosives and powder to be
sent. From mid-1941 to mid-1945, the production of explosives in the USSR came to 600,000 tons.
R. H. Jones, e Roads to Russia: United States Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union (Norman, Oklahoma:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), appendixes. e United States supplied 295,600 tons of ex-
plosives. Soviet Foreign Policy in the Period of the Great Patriotic War (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1946),
145–47. Additionally, Great Britain and Canada delivered 22,300 tons of powder. erefore, Western
deliveries of explosives reached 53 percent of the total volume of Soviet production. Also, the delivery
of American equipment for the production of bombs, shells, and ammunition played a tremendous
role in the course of the war. Specifically, in June of 1942, the most modern equipment for the daily
production of 10 million 7.62-mm rounds (3.5 billion rounds a year) was delivered. Without this truly
crucial assistance, the shell and round shortage that struck the Red Army in the fall of 1941 would not
have been overcome.

Chapter 22
Epigraph: Jan Gamarnik, Chief of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, in a speech given at a meet-
ing of the National Committee for Defense of the USSR on March 15, 1937.
1. e Winter War, 1939–1940: A Political History (Moscow: Nauka, 1998), 1: 118–26.
2. N. L. Volkovski, ed., Secrets and Lessons of the Winter War, 1939–1940 (St. Petersburg: Poligon, 2000),
141–44; Boris V. Sokolov, Secrets of the Finnish War (Moscow: Veche, 2000), 63–70. e 106th
Rifles Division was organized in accordance with the October 25, 1939, order of the USSR Defense
Commissar. Shortly before the beginning of the war, the division was reorganized as a special corps with
the same number, although at that time the Red Army rifle corps were numbered only up to fifty-six.
e commander of the corps was Division Commander A. M. Anttila. On November 23, the corps
was renamed as the 1st Alpine Rifle Corps of the Finnish People’s Army. It was staffed with the Finns