Page 355 - The Chief Culprit

300 y Notes to Pages 126–127

1945),” Statistical Digest, no. 1 (June 22, 1941), (Moscow: Military History Institute, Ministry
of Defense of the Russian Federation, 1994),10–12; 50 Years of the Soviet Armed Forces (Moscow:
Voyenizdat, 1968), 201; History of the Second World War, 1939–1945, 2: 199–202, 3: 418–19, 4: 18;
e Great Patriotic War, 1941–1945: Military History Essays, 1: 89; e Great Patriotic War, 1941–1945:
Encyclopedia (Moscow: Sovetskaya Encyclopedia, 1985), 311; Meltiukhov, Stalin’s Missed Opportunity,
292–95, 360.
10. e USSR Armed Forces’ strength by June 22, 1941, was 5,762,000, including the Red Army—
5,081,000, navy—344,000, and interior troops and border guards—337,000. e numerical increase
of the Red Army in 1939–41 was not a straightforward process of constant growth. Before Germany
attacked the USSR, the Red Army reached its highest numbers not by June 22, 1941, but by September
20, 1939. By September 20, 1939, the Red Army—without the navy, interior troops, and border
guards—numbered 5,289,400 men (in comparison to 5,081,000 by June 22, 1941). Here is how it
happened: On the night of September 7, 1939, a decision was made to execute a partial mobilization
of the Red Army. e troops were given the order to start a “Big Training Call-up” (BUS). Under
the People’s Commissar Decree No. 2/1/50698 of May 20, 1939, the acronym BUS was a coded sig-
nal for the covert mobilization. BUS with an “A” designation meant deployment of individual units
with the operational readiness date of up to ten days with their support elements reaching war-level
strength. e mobilization was supposed to be executed with the maximum secrecy. All together, at the
beginning of the “Big Training Call-up” were involved: headquarters of twenty-two rifle, five cavalry,
and three tank corps; ninety-eight rifle and fourteen cavalry divisions; twenty-eight tank and three
mechanized rifle/machine-gun; and one airborne brigade, deployed in seven military districts. In total,
2,610,136 men were drafted. Under the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and People’s Commissar of
Defense Decree No.177 of September 23, they were declared mobilized until a “special instruction.”
At the same time, under the Council of People’s Commissars of USSR Decree No. 1348-268cc from
September 1939, a new military draft was supposed to start from September 5 to reinforce the troops
in the Far East region, plus one thousand men for each newly formed division, and from September
15 to reinforce the troops in the rest of the military districts. Besides, under the new law regarding
the universal military duty, the call-up period was extended by one year for 190,000 soldiers who
were drafted in 1939. As a result, by September 20, 1940, the Red Army’s strength reached 5 million
men. It was clear evidence of Stalin’s insecurity about Great Britain and France’s reaction to the Soviet
invasion into Poland. Although he did everything possible to make Soviet actions not look like as-
sistance to Hitler, there was a reason to be concerned that, after declaring war on Germany, London
and Paris were going to declare war on the USSR as well. Once the intentions of the Western powers
became clear, the Red Army began to deflate its swollen ranks, which had been prepared for a big war.
A total of 1,613,803 men were retired from the Red Army from September 29 to January 7, 1940.
However, when the war with Finland began it required that the Red Army’s losses be replenished and
its strength boosted. On December 28, 1939, a decision was made to call up to the Red Army 546,400
men to reinforce the troops in the western military districts, as well as fifty thousand reserve officers.
In the same time, in the Volga, Ural, and Siberian Military Districts 375,000 young men of five junior
conscription ages were drafted. After the war with Finland was over, the Red Army started to decrease
its ranks again, and reached its minimum strength by September 1, 1940: 3,423, 499 men. Afterwards,
the Red Army’s ranks started to increase again.
11. VIZh, no. 3 (1999): 10.

Chapter 21
Epigraph: Colonel S. A. Vauphsassov, At a Troublesome Crossroads: A Chekist’s Memoirs (Moscow:
Politizdat, 1971), 203.
1. VIZh, no. 7 (1982): 55.
2. Anthony Sutton, National Suicide: Military Aid to the Soviet Union (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington
House, 1973), 152–53. According to the opinion of the American historian Anthony Sutton, the
German delegation transferred to the Soviet Union blueprints of the most successful German sub-
marine designs in June of 1926. e German V-III–class submarine was “the most successful design
of all, ever produced.” In Sutton’s opinion, the Soviet Schuka-class submarine is based exactly on the