Page 354 - The Chief Culprit

Notes to Pages 107–126 y 299

3. Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn [International Affairs], no. 3 (1959): 157.
4. VIZh, no. 12 (1963): 25.
5. VIZh, no. 5 (1989): 35.
6. VIZh, no. 6 (1991): 11.
7. Ingeborg Fleischhauer, e Pact: Hitler, Stalin and the German Diplomatic Initiative, 1938–39 (Moscow:
Progress, 1990), 237–38; G. L. Rozanov, Stalin-Hitler: e Documented Story of the Soviet-German
Diplomatic Relationship in 1939–41 (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyie Otnoshenia, 1991), 84–86. is
decision was presented in the form of a telegram, sent by Molotov to the Soviet chargé d’affaires in
Germany, Gheorghy Astakhov. He received the message on Saturday, August 12. e same day the
telegram’s content was conveyed to Hitler, who at that moment was negotiating with the Italian for-
eign minister Count Ciano. After some deliberation, Hitler told the following to the Italian minis-
ter about the telegram in the following way: “ e Russians have agreed with the decision to send a
German representative to Moscow to conduct political negotiations.” Ciano himself left the follow-
ing entry: “Russian-German contacts are developing very favorably and, specifically, several days ago
came the Russian invitation to send a German plenipotentiary representative to Moscow to negotiate a
Friendship Pact.”
8. On August 19, 1939, Stalin gave an order to the Soviet Trade Mission in Berlin (not a direct one, of
course) to immediately sign the Trade and Economic Agreement, which had been ready for a long time.
e same day Stalin, via Molotov, told Schulenburg that Ribbentrop might arrive in Moscow on August
26–27. Later, Hitler tearfully begged to move Ribbentrop’s visit to Moscow to August 23.
9. Lev Bezymenskiy, Hitler and Stalin before the Fight (Moscow: Veche, 2000), 290; A. O. Chubarian, ed.,
War and Politics, 1939–1941 (Moscow: Nauka, 1999), 38, 97.
10. Hitler, Mein Kampf, pt. 2, chap. XIV.

Chapter 18
Epigraph: Antonov-Ovseenko, Portrait of a Tyrant, 296.
1. Yury Felshtinsky, ed., It Must Be Published: USSR-Germany 1939–1941, Documents and Materials
(Moscow: Moscow Worker, 1991), 90.

Chapter 19
Epigraph: Halder, War Diary, 1939–1942, entry from June 23, 1941.
1. Soviet Military Encyclopedia, 8: 353.
2. B. Muller-Hillebrand, Germany’s Ground Forces 1933–1945 (Moscow: EKSMO, 2002), 1: 157.
3. Krasnaya Zvezda, August 18, 1993.
4. e main strike forces in the breakthrough of the Japanese defense lines in the August 20 offensive were
the excellent twin-engine bombers SB, totaling 181 aircraft. Besides these, several squadrons of TB-3
heavy bombers were used. ey bombed the Japanese positions from an altitude of 1,500 to 2,000
meters. All together, twenty-three heavy bombers were deployed.
5. Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy: e Indirect Approach (Moscow: Innostrannaya Literatura, 1957),
314.

Chapter 20
Epigraph: Boris Shaposhnikov, e Army’s Brain (Moscow-Leningrad: Voyengiz, 1927–29), 413.
1. VIZh, no. 6 (1976): 68.
2. Yakovlev, Life’s Task, 498.
3. Dmitry F. Ustinov, In the Name of Victory (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1988), 91.
4. G. K. Zhukov, Memoirs and Reflections (Moscow: APN, 1969), 296.
5. VIZh, no. 2 (1962).
6. K. A. Meretskov, In Service to the People (Moscow: Politizdat, 1968), 181.
7. Yakovlev, Life’s Task, 212.
8. Pravda (September 3, 1939). e draft age of eighteen years was established for those who had gradu-
ated from high school. Mostly they were drafted into military schools (roughly equivalent to officer
training schools)—willing or not.
9. “Operational and total strength of the USSR Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War (1941–