Page 68 - The Chief Culprit

Stalin’s Preparations for War: Tanks y 45

was considered a medium tank, but in weight it equaled the Soviet heavy tanks: the most mas-
sive version of the Panther weighed 45.5 tons, while the Soviet heavy tank IS-2 weighed 46
tons. In length, width, and height of the body, the Panther surpassed the Soviet heavy KV and
IS tanks. is meant that it was easier to hit the Panther. If we have two safes of equal weights,
but different sizes, the one that is larger in size has thinner walls. e same thing is true for
tanks: larger sizes given equal weights always means weaker armor protection.
With its dimensions and weight, the Panther could not compete with the T-34 in any-
thing related to mobility. e T-34 surpassed the Panther in maneuverability, acceleration,
and cross-country mobility, that is, in all parameters needed for offence. No matter how fero-
cious a tank is in defense, a country cannot win a war through defense. I will reiterate that
only mobility can bring victory. e T-34 was good for maneuver warfare, while the Panther
was completely unfit for it. ere was not a single successful offensive operation in history
that was conducted with the participation of Tiger and Panther tanks. German General F. W.
von Mellentin described the T-34 as “the best example of an offensive weapon of [World War
II].” e heavy Panther could crush anybody in defense, but it could not compete with the
T-34 on a raid of many kilometers deep into the enemy rear.
It is simple to create complicated things. It is very difficult to create simple things. e
designers of the T-34 tank made it as simple as possible. erefore, the T-34 was good for mass
production. Before the war, tanks in the Soviet Union were produced in three main centers:
Leningrad, Stalingrad, and Kharkov. Kharkov was lost during the course of the war. Leningrad
was not lost, but the Kirov plant, which prior to the war built tanks, was only seven streetcar
stops away from the front line. Leningrad was under siege, and had no metals, no energy, and
therefore no mass production of tanks. Stalingrad was not lost, but the events of the war were
not beneficial for mass tank production. After the three main centers stopped production, it
was organized in new places, and during World War II there were more T-34 tanks produced
alone than tanks of all types in Great Britain, Germany, and Japan put together. 15
e Panther’s main flaw was its complex design, which made the tank unfit for mass
production. Only 5,976 tanks of this model were produced. Additionally, another 392 self-
propelled guns based on the Panther were made. e Soviet Union produced nine T-34s for
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every Panther. For every self-propelled gun based on the Panther, the Soviet Union produced
thirteen Su-85 and Su-100 self-propelled guns based on the T-34. Just of these two types,
5,139 self-propelled guns were produced. 18
General Heinz Guderian loved the Panther with all his heart, but when Hitler ordered
a halt in the production of all earlier models, so that only Panthers and Tigers would be
produced, Guderian protested and managed to reverse the order. He was right: if only the
most expensive and complex tanks were produced, there would be few of them. After the war
Guderian wrote: “Such a path inevitably led to the defeat of Germany in the near future. e
Russians would have won the war without help from the West, and occupied all of Europe.
No force on earth could have stopped them. Europe’s problems would have been simplified
and we all would have learned what real ‘democracy’ means.”
19
e Germans were unable to design a good tank for mass production. erefore, until
almost the very end of the war Germany had to produce obsolete models to supplement the
Tigers and Panthers and compensate for the losses incurred in battle. e American tank
expert Steven Zaloga went so far as to consider the production of Panthers a mistake: “ e
decision to enlist among weapons such a large, heavy, and complex tank as the Panther in the