Page 67 - The Chief Culprit

44 y e Chief Culprit

e T-34 was famous, because all its innovations were incorporated into one design,
and it achieved a harmonic combination of all its remarkable qualities. On top of everything,
the T-34, unlike other tanks, was good for mass production. Any large-scale automobile fac-
tory could be converted to produce this tank. e production of the T-34 did not demand a
highly qualified workforce. It was easy to use and repair. e T-34 had almost inexhaustible
reserves for improvement. Its weight could be significantly increased without lowering the
quality of its movement characteristics.
e T-34 served not only as a model for many imitations, but was also the prototype
for many generations of new tank models. Not a single tank of World War II left behind it a
row of descendants. e only exceptions were the T-34 and the KV. e KV was constantly
improved upon and became the IS-1, then underwent a long evolution and turned into the
IS-4 and the T-10. e lineage of the T-34 continues today, and direct descendants of the
T-34 are among the most numerous units in the world.
In June 1941, the Red Army suffered a crushing defeat, which had to be explained.
Communist historians acknowledged the remarkable qualities of the T-34, but added that
these tanks were very few in number; there were only 967 of them. Many educated and hon-
est historians repeated that on June 21, 1941, Stalin only had 967 T-34s. Even if this had
been true, the word “only” was disputable—the rest of the world had none. In the five west-
ern border military districts, which constituted the first strategic echelon of the Red Army,
there really were 967 T-34 tanks. But the forces of the second strategic echelon were being
secretly transferred to the western regions of the country. ey also had T-34 tanks. In total,
the Red Army had 1,225 of them on May 31, 1941. By June 21, the factories shipped out
and unloaded another 138 T-34s. On top of this, another 37 T-34s were produced, tested,
but not yet shipped. Overall, at the time of the invasion, the Soviet Union had exactly 1,400
T-34s. 13
However, even this was not all. e T-34 was produced in series. Meanwhile, the at-
tempts to create an equal or superior tank in Germany began only on November 25, 1941.
In June, July, August, September, and October 1941, Germany had not yet begun attempts
to create an analogous tank, while the Soviet factories continued producing the T-34. During
the second half of 1941, Soviet industry put out another 1,789 T-34s in addition to the 1,400
that existed on June 22. In 1942, the production of T-34s went at a rate of thirty-five a day. In
1942, 12,520 T-34 tanks were produced. Very few, I agree. But in Germany, the production
14
of an analogous tank had not yet begun.
e German equal of the T-34 was the Panther, which first appeared in the summer of
1943 during the great tank battle at Kursk. e Panther was a magnificent tank. Some ex-
perts considered it the best tank of World War II, and claimed that the Panther surpassed the
T-34 in all aspects. Oddly enough, after the war, practically all designers in the world copied
the best aspects of the T-34, while nobody copied the Panther. is tank did not leave any
descendants behind, and for a good reason. Let’s look at those parameters according to which
the Panther did not surpass the T-34.
First, the T-34 had a diesel engine, while the Panther had a carburetor one. A diesel en-
gine was more economical and less susceptible to fire. Second, the Panther had a very irratio-
nal design. e designers copied many aspects of the T-34, but not the most important—the
rational location of both the engine and the transmission, in the rear of the tank. As a result,
the Panther weighed 44.8 tons, even though it was supposed to weigh 30 tons. e Panther