Page 62 - The Chief Culprit

Stalin and the Destruction of Soviet Strategic Aviation y 39

to his target, recognize it, and hit the enemy precisely without hitting his own troops. e
bomber is not needed. One needs a plane that either dives from heights or comes to the target
in a hedgehopping flight, barely missing the treetops.
If we plan to blow up the neighbor’s house, we need a crate of dynamite. But if we plan
to kill the neighbor, and take over his house, we do not need the dynamite; we need cheaper,
lighter, and more precise tools. Lapchinsky recommended to Stalin a different tool: a light
bomber or a low-flying attack plane. A strategic bomber flies from faraway stationary bases
and covers great distances, while the Soviets needed a plane that would always be nearby,
could land on any dirt airfield, could easily change bases following advancing divisions, and
could immediately fulfill the requests of tankers. ey needed a light plane, whose pilots
could themselves see the situation and instantly react to changes, contributing to the success-
ful outcome of a quick and decisive battle.
Vladimir Petliakov, aside from the heavy four-engine (or rather five-engine) TB-7, cre-
ated another plane—a small, twin engine, fast, maneuverable dive-bomber, the Pe-2. is was
exactly what Stalin needed. Stalin decided: “Build two-motor ones, as many as possible.”
19
Was it not possible to build heavy and light bombers simultaneously? “No,” said Lapchinsky,
“impossible.” All resources, all efforts had to be concentrated on achieving the central goal:
obtaining full air superiority through a sudden attack on enemy air bases. If such a strike was
delivered, there would be no need to bomb cities and factories. Stalin allowed the production
of both types of airplane for a long time, but then understood that he must choose one or the
other. He made his choice.
If we cannot grasp Stalin’s iron logic, it is easier to declare Stalin insane. But let us look
at Hitler. He is also an aggressor, and that is why he also has no strategic aviation. Hitler
prepared a lightning takeover of France, and needed to take over and safeguard bridges rather
than bomb them. German tank divisions needed the bridges for quick advancement. Paris
also did not need to be bombed. Paris, with all its treasures, would go to the victor. Hitler
did not need to destroy the shipyards of Brest, the tank and artillery factories of Cherbourg,
Chaumont, and Bourges, the airplane factories of Amsterdam and Toulouse. ey would be
needed to strengthen the military might of the ird Reich!
For the blitzkrieg, Hitler needed aviation, but the type that would destroy French planes
on the ground and paralyze, through sudden strikes, the French system of military command,
not the type that destroys cities and factories. He needed aviation that would open the way
for tanks and secure the quickness of their thrust toward the ocean. He needed aviation that
hovered over the battlefields, fulfilling the requests from the tankers; aviation that struck not
on giant areas, but on concrete targets. For the Blitzkrieg, he needed a small dive-bomber that
carried a light load, but bombs precisely: a single-engine Ju-87, or a dual-engine Ju-88.
Later, the war changed its course and turned from a quick war into a war of attri-
tion. New cities inaccessible to Hitler’s tanks became targets—London, Cheliabinsk, Bristol,
Kuibyshev, Sheffield, and Magnitogorsk. Here, Hitler would not have minded having strate-
gic aviation, but he did not have any.
Lapchinsky’s ideas, written long before Hitler came to power, were used by Stalin. Not
in 1941, as was planned, but in 1945. Stalin’s Pe-2 dive-bombers and low-flying attack planes
Il-2 suddenly attacked Japanese airbases, and Soviet tank units entered Manchuria. It was an
easy victory. When Japan was bled to death by fighting in the Pacific, and the first A-bomb
was dropped, Stalin conveniently struck from the rear and seized Manchuria, creating the