Page 60 - The Chief Culprit

Stalin and the Destruction of Soviet Strategic Aviation y 37

e question is not whether or not there would have been enough time to build a thou-
sand TB-7s before the beginning of the war. e question is: why did they not try?
By the time the TB-7 came onto the scene, the Soviet Union had created design bureaus
capable of creating airplanes that were ahead of their time, and an industry capable of a mass
output that surpassed the demand of peacetime. Air academies, pilot schools, and technical
schools were opened, the theory of military use was developed, and combat experience was
obtained in local conflicts and grandiose training exercises. Air bases, learning centers, and
test sites were built; personnel from command staff to machine-gun operators, from naviga-
tion officers to engineers to photo-decipherers were trained. Pilots, meteorologists, aviation
medics, and others were all ready. Collectives formed, traditions were born, theorists and
practitioners were raised.
After all this, the country that was the leader in the field of strategic aviation entered
World War II without strategic aviation. On Stalin’s orders, in November 1940, the Soviet air
armies were disbanded. On June 22, 1941, Soviet strategic aviation did not have any armies in
its ranks. Only five corps and three separate divisions remained. ey were mostly equipped
with the DB-3f, which is a magnificent bomber, but not a strategic bomber. ey also still
had TB-3s, which could be used to transport cargo, but as bombers they were obsolete. As we
already know, there were only eleven TB-7s, not even enough to outfit one squadron.
It seems that there was no situation in which the TB-7 would become superfluous. If
Stalin planned to avert World War II, he needed the TB-7. If Stalin decided to allow Hitler to
unleash the world war, and planned to himself remain neutral, the TB-7 would be very needed,
as a guarantee of neutrality. If Stalin planned defensive war, troops should have been ordered
to dig themselves into the ground, as was done later on near Kursk. He needed to barricade the
borders with impassable minefields from sea to sea, and while the enemy would be gnawing
through our defenses, let the TB-7 fly at unreachable altitudes and ruin German economic pow-
er. In a defensive war, the TB-7s were needed. Stalin’s resources were unlimited, while Hitler’s
were limited. erefore, if the war started, it was to Stalin’s advantage to draw it out: a war
of attrition was deadly for Germany. In order to exhaust the enemy’s resources more quickly,
Stalin needed strategic bombers to weaken the military and economic potential of the enemy.
ere could be no better instrument for such a task than the TB-7.
e fate of the TB-7 disproves the legend that Stalin feared Hitler. If he was afraid, why
not order the TB-7? e more he feared, the more planes he should have ordered. e reader
should agree with me that when at night we fear walking across a cemetery, we pick up a stick.
e more we fear, the bigger the stick we pick up, and we swing it menacingly. Stalin, on the
other hand, had to be coaxed into picking up a stick. His personal advisor, airplane designer
Lieutenant Colonel General Alexander Yakovlev, testifies that the chief of an R&D Center of
the Air Forces, Major General A. I. Philin, was not afraid to prove to Stalin, in the presence
of many, the necessity of producing a series of TB-7s.
Arguing with Stalin was tantamount to suicide. “Philin demanded, a few others sup-
ported him. In the end, Stalin conceded, saying: ‘OK, let it be your way, though you have
not convinced me.’” is is one of those cases when Stalin allowed the issue of TB-7s. Soon
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after, Stalin changed his mind and repealed his order. Once again, some brave souls began to
argue and plead with him. e question is: Why was it necessary to prove to Stalin this plane’s
usefulness? If we all understand the indisputable advantages of the TB-7 and the need for its
production, why could not Stalin understand such simple facts? If everything boils down to