Page 56 - The Chief Culprit

Stalin and the Destruction of Soviet Strategic Aviation y 33

United States and in Britain. It was thought that the only possible route was through Siberia and
Alaska. But Molotov flew on a TB-7 from Moscow to Britain over occupied Europe. One must
remember who ruled the skies above Europe in the spring of 1942, in order to appraise the level
of trust of Soviet leadership in this airplane. Molotov did not fear landing on the defendant’s
bench in Nazi court, and Stalin did not fear letting Molotov fly. e TB-7 proved itself. It flew
over all of Europe, stopped in Britain, flew to America, and returned by the same route, once
again flying over German holdings undisturbed.
After the war, a commission of the Soviet government conducted an analysis of the German
anti-aircraft defenses at the time of Molotov’s flight. It turned out that, along the flight path,
German fighters did not go up to intercept the enemy aircraft, there was no alert sounded at the
anti-aircraft batteries, the observation posts did not register the flight of the TB-7 at all. Simply
put, the German anti-aircraft defenses not only could not take down the TB-7, they could not
detect its presence in their air territory.
Colonel (at that time, Captain) E. Pussep, who flew a TB-7 over Germany many times
(not only with Molotov’s precious self, but with other cargo), recounted: “ e anti-aircraft guns
reach at such altitudes with hardly any aim, if at all. A fighter plane at such height can act only
like a sleepy fly. Who can do anything to me?” 8
So, long before the war the Soviet Union had created an untouchable bomber, and a gov-
ernment order was prepared to produce a thousand TB-7s by November 1940. What remained
to be done? All that was left to do was to sign the order with seven letters: J. STALIN. 9
When the first TB-7s flew at unreachable altitudes, engineers in other countries of the
world still had problems with the unseen barrier of height: in thin air, engines lost their power
from a deficiency of oxygen. ey literally suffocated, like mountaineers at the summit of
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Mount Everest. One possible way of increasing the power of engines existed: to use exhaust gases
to rotate a turbo-compressor, which supplies the engine with additional air. is was simple in
theory, difficult in practice. In experimental trials, in record-setting airplanes, this was successful.
But in series models, it was not.
Components of the turbo-compressor work in a hot stream of corrosive gas at a tempera-
ture of over 1000 degrees Celsius when the surrounding air is minus 60 degrees Celsius, and
then return to the warm ground. Uneven heating and rapid changes in pressure and temperature
ruined the parts, and the sound of the turbo-compressor drowned out the roar of the engines.
Protective paints and coatings burned during the first flight and, when back on the ground,
moisture settled on cooling engines, and corrosion ate through the mechanisms. e bearings
had the worst fate: they melted, like wax candles. On a trial plane, if out of ten attempts one
time the turbo-compressor doesn’t break, good. But what is one to do with the mass production
airplanes?
Everyone searched for the solution, but it was discovered by Vladimir Petliakov, the creator
of the TB-7. Petliakov’s solution was kept as a top government secret. e TB-7 had four propel-
lers, and from the outside appeared to be a four-engine plane. But inside its body, behind the
crew cabin, Petliakov installed an additional fifth engine, which did not rotate any propellers.
At low and medium altitudes, the four main engines were engaged, and at high altitudes, the
fifth was switched on and brought into action the system of a centralized supply of additional
oxygen. Using this oxygen, the fifth engine fed itself and the four others. at is how the TB-7
could climb where no other plane could reach it. With it, one could fly over Europe, bomb any
object, and not worry about its own safety.