Page 57 - The Chief Culprit

34 y e Chief Culprit

With a thousand untouchable TB-7s, any invasion could have been averted. All that
had to be done was to invite delegations of certain countries and in their presence somewhere
in a remote steppe drop at least one thousand tons of bombs from astounding altitudes. 11
en follow up with an explanation: is has nothing to do with you, this is a surprise we
hold for the capital city of that country which ventures to attack ours. Precision? ere is
no precision. Why would there be? We drop the bombs from incredible heights. e lack of
precision will be corrected through repeated drops. Every day several hundred tons will rain
on the capital of the aggressor, until we reach the desired outcome, and then other cities will
get a taste of this hailstorm as well. Do you understand what will happen to the opponent
before he has a chance to reach Moscow? e TB-7 is untouchable when in the air, and can-
not be attacked by the opponent on land: our bases are hidden far from the borders, and our
probable enemies have no strategic aviation to speak of. . . . And now, gentlemen, let us drink
to eternal peace.
Such a speech could have been given by Stalin’s diplomats, if the Soviet Union had sev-
eral hundred or even a thousand TB-7s. But Stalin decided not to build a thousand TB-7s. Is
it possible to understand Stalin’s motives? Yes, it is possible.
If we compare a thousand TB-7s to a game of chess, this situation is the equivalent of
being able to declare checkmate to the opponent’s king before the start of the game, and if
the partner still ventures to play, one can call checkmate after his first move. If one thousand
tons of bombs, which several hundred TB-7s could deliver in one trip, are to be translated
into contemporary strategic terms, it is equivalent to one kiloton. is is the language of the
nuclear age. If one kiloton is insufficient, in two sorties twice this amount can be delivered.
Twenty kilotons equals what (without much precision) was dropped on Hiroshima. A thou-
sand TB-7s is like a nuclear missile, aimed at the enemy’s capital. e power is such that, for
a potential aggressor, war loses all sense.
Some argue that during the course of the war the British and American strategic avia-
tion dropped many more bombs on Germany, without being able to bomb her into surren-
der. is is true. However, these were bomb raids during the course of the war, when it was
too late for Hitler to ask for mercy. A different story would have been to demonstrate such
power to Hitler and his generals before the war, and warn them that if they started a war
all this would fall on their heads. In that case, Hitler personally, or those surrounding him,
would have thought twice about the consequences of their actions.
In the late 1930s Stalin had the capacity to create an instrument that would serve as
a severe warning to Hitler. With one stroke of Stalin’s pen on an order to produce a series
of TB-7s, the German invasion of Soviet territory could have been averted. Of course, in
August 1939 Stalin could not have had a thousand TB-7s. But he could have had two, three,
four, or maybe even five hundred. If only Stalin had in due time signed an order for the serial
production of the TB-7.
To do him justice, it must be noted that Stalin did sign such an order—but then he
canceled it. And signed it again! And repealed it again, and again. Four times the production
of TB-7s started, and four times it was canceled. After each order, the industry had time to
12
put out three or four TB-7s, and then the order was reversed. Everything started anew, and
once again was interrupted. By June 22, 1941, the TB-7 series was not in production. In
the four attempts, the aviation industry had time to issue and give over to the air force not a
thousand TB-7s, but only eleven. Moreover, almost all of the eleven planes lacked the most