Page 78 - The Chief Culprit

On the “Obsolete” Soviet Tanks y 55

off from his supply bases, to reach his capital, his industrial regions, his sources of oil, and
his ports. A heavy tank is not very good for such a thrust. Due to its weight, it breaks roads
and bridges and gets in the way of all those who are following. A heavy tank consumes a lot
of fuel—try to provide fuel to several thousand tanks and artillery tow trucks and tens of
thousands of automobiles, which are pushing forward deep into enemy territory. Aside from
all this, a heavy tank is also slow and not very agile. It slows down the movement of your
columns. Moreover, it quickly wears out and chokes, like a heavyweight in a marathon. For a
forward thrust, medium and light tanks are ideal. ey have less armor, weaker weapons, but
they have much higher speed, maneuverability, and cross-country ability, and they are more
economical with their fuel.
Now our armored armada is standing before a water obstacle. Here all heavy and me-
dium tanks, and those light ones that have not been taught how to float, lose all their ag-
gressive options. eir value is zero. ey need a bridge. But the enemy protects the bridges,
and blows them up when threatened with a takeover. Bridges have to be fought for. And it is
better to fight for them not from our side, but from the side of the enemy, from where they
are not anticipating it. In this situation, the value of light amphibious tanks grows tremen-
dously. If two, three, five, ten such tanks sail across the river during the night in the direction
of the bridge, and with a sudden attack from the rear seize the bridge, this can decide the fate
of an entire operation, or even an entire war. Now you can send to the enemy shores, across
the newly seized bridge, your heavy and medium tanks, along with artillery, infantry, staff,
hospitals, thousands of tons of ammunition, fuel, and spare parts. You can use the seized
bridge to send in reserves, and to send the wounded, prisoners, and trophies to the rear, to
send damaged machinery back for repair.
If it is impossible to seize the bridge, the amphibious tanks become truly priceless. If
there are no enemy bridges, we need to establish our own temporary bridges and means of
sending goods across the river. For this we need to establish a bridgehead on the other side.
e infantry is sent into battle. On logs, wooden planks, and inflatable rafts, they swim to the
other shore. Meanwhile they are being fired upon by machine guns, mortars, and automatic
rifles. Here, among the swimming men, imagine having ten or twenty light tanks. eir
armor is not harmed by bullets and shell fragments, while their machine guns are capable of
firing when none of the swimming men can.
Now we have reached the other shore. e most important thing is to catch hold of
something, to dig our forces into the ground during the next twenty minutes or so, so that no
counterattacks can hinder us. en the mortars and machine guns are not so destructive, and
the enemy gunners and snipers are not quite so deadly. Our wet, wounded, and exhausted in-
fantry does not carry heavy weapons or ammunition. So, in these very first, most frightening
minutes on enemy shores, the presence, help, and support of even one of the lightest tanks
with just one machine gun is far more valuable and important than ten more powerful heavy
tanks that would be forced to remain on our side of the river.
e number of Soviet amphibious tanks was kept secret for half a century. Later, it
slowly began to become clearer. So, how many of them were there? e answer is: there were
2,627 T-37A tanks produced. In local conflicts the T-37A was rarely used, and they were
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rarely sent abroad. So in 1941, they were almost all fully functioning. In 1936, production of
a perfected T-38 amphibious tank began. is tank continued to be produced in series until
1939. Overall, 1,375 tanks of this type were produced. e Kremlin historians called this
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