Page 82 - The Chief Culprit

Winged Genghis Khan y 59

rounds of 132-mm caliber. A salvo from the BM-8 was thirty-six rocket-propelled rounds
of 82-mm caliber (forty-eight rounds starting in 1942). One battery consisted of four to six
BM-8s or BM-13s. Usually one target was fired upon not by one battery, but by a group of
batteries or even regiments. e advantage lay in the fact that hundreds or even thousands
of missiles covered a huge territory almost simultaneously. Fire from a group of batteries was
an avalanche of fire, accompanied by wild roar and noise. Many German soldiers, officers,
and generals remember that this was a terrible weapon. General Field Marshal Albrecht von
Kesselring: “ e terrible psychological effect of ‘Stalin’s Pipe Organs’ is a highly unpleasant
memory for any German soldier who was on the Eastern front.” 2
e statistics are as follows: on June 1, 1941, the Red Army had seven BM-13 rocket
launcher vehicles. One month later, there were seventeen such vehicles. Some were destroyed
in battle, but others were produced, and by September 1 there were forty-nine of them.
Production of the BM-8 began at the same time. By October 1, 1941, the Red Army, despite
its losses, had 406 BM-8s and BM-13s. Later on, the count would mount into the thousands,
and soon this weapon became a mass weapon. Despite losses of industrial and raw material
bases, the Soviet Union managed to quickly supply its army with a principally new system
of weapons.
In 1940 the Red Army’s Air Force received into their inventory the newest airplane,
the “Ivanov” Su-2. It was created by a group of designers headed by Pavel Osipovich Sukhoy,
one of the greatest aviation designers of the twentieth century. Stalin personally issued the
order to design the Ivanov. In the history of Soviet aviation, there was only one airplane that
was designed under Stalin’s secret pseudonym; moreover, the name of the project was not
the initiative of devoted low-ranking officials, but given directly by Stalin himself. Aviation
designer V. Shavrov testifies: “ e codename ‘Ivanov’ was given according to Stalin’s order. It
was his telegraph address.” ere was no airplane yet, the designers had not even picked up
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their pencils, but Stalin had already given his name to the plane. e eventual production was
planned for about 100,000 to 150,000 planes of this type.
e Su-2 had many uses: it could be a light bomber, a tactical reconnaissance plane,
and an attack plane. Its design was extremely simple and rational. e Su-2 was better suited
for mass production than any other airplane in the world. It possessed great firepower. Under
its wings it could carry up to ten rocket-propelled shells of 82-mm or 132-mm caliber. ese
were eventually installed at the end of 1941 on some of the aircraft; they were the same mis-
siles that were fired by “Stalin’s Pipe Organs,” the BM-8 and BM-13. e rocket-propelled
shells were a ferocious weapon, especially if used suddenly and simultaneously by groups of
ten planes from an extremely low altitude. Groups of Su-2 planes were to become “flying bat-
teries.” Aside from rocket missiles, the Ivanov Su-2 carried 400 to 600 kilograms of bombs,
and five ShKAS machine guns (on the later Su-2 modifications), which at that time held the
record in firing rate.
is was a magnificent airplane. e Su-2 had dual controls—one for the pilot and one
for the gunner-navigator sitting behind him. erefore, there was no need to put out a train-
ing version of the model: every battle-ready Su-2 could be used for training, and every plane
used for training could also be used in battle. is simplified the mass preparation of pilots.
e Su-2 could be managed by a pilot of any qualification.
Lieutenant General Anatoly Pushkin (in 1941 he was a major, commander of the 52nd
Air Regiment) remembers: “ e Su-2 was also great because it did not need airbases. It could
take off and land on any even field.”