Page 87 - The Chief Culprit

64 y e Chief Culprit

blow to Crete. Here they encountered British troops, but the strike was a surprise, so the Ju-
87 once again became the symbol of Blitzkrieg, success, and victory. In June came a sudden
attack on Soviet air bases. On a beautiful sunny morning, the German air force secured for
itself a clear sky and could use airplanes of any model—there was nobody to be afraid of.
e Ju-87’s rule lasted until the time when Soviet aviation gained strength. In the sec-
ond half of the war, the Ju-87 was being used more and more rarely on the Soviet-German
front, until it completely disappeared. “During the course of the eastern campaign, the loss
of air superiority during a short time put in question the usefulness of using [the] relatively
slow and not maneuverable dive-bombers Ju-87.” 9
e Ivanov was created later than the Ju-87. erefore, the Ivanov’s characteristics were
higher, and in terms of designs the two planes had significant differences. But in spirit and
general idea, in their assigned roles, the Ju-87 and Ivanov are twins. e plane Nakajima
B-5N and the Ivanov are brothers, not just in idea and spirit, but in their main characteristics
as well.
e planes for sudden attack did not need record-breaking characteristics. Stalin’s logic
is clear and simple: if a sudden attack can take care of the enemy’s air bases and clear the sky
of enemy planes, we will need a simple airplane with powerful weapons that can be mass pro-
duced; the most important of its designated uses is to give support to our advancing waves of
tanks and paratroops, creating an air terror above defenseless territories. is was exactly the
sort of airplane Stalin ordered from his designers.
e Su-2 had a tragic fate. In terms of firepower and speed it surpassed both the
German Ju-87 and the Japanese Nakajima. But both the Ju-87 and the Nakajima B-5N got
a chance to prove themselves in sudden attacks and gain fame. Hitler did not permit the
Ivanov to do the work it was primarily designed to do. Hitler carried out a preemptive strike
on Soviet air bases, so the Su-2 was left without the work for which it was created. e Su-2
was not needed in a defensive war. Some factories that were preparing the mass output of
Su-2s (for example the Kharkov aviation factory) fell into enemy hands. Although some of
the production equipment was evacuated, the production pace was lost. e Su-2s produced
earlier suffered great casualties: they had little speed and could not escape the enemy when
chased. ey had weak defense weapons and could not fight off the fighters. Also, there were
no Soviet fighters to give the Su-2 cover.
In a defensive war, fighters are needed first and foremost. Aviation designer S. A.
Lavochkin urgently needed a powerful, reliable engine for the modernization of the LaGG-3
fighter, and he needed it in huge quantities. No problems arose—industry was prepared to
produce the M-82 engine, which was meant for the Su-2 (as the replacement for the original
M-8 and M-88B engines, which did not work as well as expected), in any quantity. Lavochkin
installed it, and the renowned fighter La-5, beloved by pilots, was born.
Soviet industry was prepared for the mass production of ShKAS machine guns for
many different types of airplanes, but before all for the Su-2. e Su-2 was only produced
in limited numbers, but the preparedness of industry was not wasted. ese machine guns
were simply installed on other types of airplanes. Soviet industry was prepared for the mass
production of bombs for the Su-2, and it did produce them. ese bombs went to arming
different types of airplanes as well. Soviet industry was ready to mass-produce 82-mm- and
132-mm-caliber rocket missiles, and it did produce them. ey were used not only in avia-
tion, but in ground artillery as well. In the blink of an eye, the Red Army had thousands of