Page 95 - Leadership in the Indian Army
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163 Infantry Brigade under Brigadier Harbaksh Singh was in the
Handwara–Kupwara area. On 13 May 1948, Thimayya held a meeting to
share his plans for the summer offensive. The main thrust, by 161 Infantry
Brigade, was to advance to Domel on 20 May 1948, after being relieved by
77 Parachute Brigade under Brigadier Nair that had already arrived in the
Valley. A diversionary thrust by 163 Infantry Brigade was to commence on
18 May and advance to Tithwal. By the end of June 1948, Nastachun Pass
had been captured, and the area upto the Kishenganga River cleared by 163
Infantry Brigade. In the Uri sector, 161 Infantry Brigade had captured
Pirkanthi and Ledi Galli. Razdhangan Pass in northern Kashmir was also
captured. At this juncture, the government decided to cease offensive
operations, as the matter had been referred to the United Nations. Domel
had still not been captured, but over 350 square miles of territory had been
liberated from enemy occupation.
The decision to suspend offensive operations came as a shock, and
Cariappa protested strongly to the government, especially because Pakistan
had not accepted the UN resolution and was continuing with her operations.
Finally, the government approved that operations could be undertaken for
the link-up with Leh and Punch, which had to be held at all costs. These
were to be in the nature of defensive operations. However, the road to Leh
could be opened only after the capture of Dras, Zojila and Kargil, all of
which were held by the enemy. The operation for achieving this objective
was code-named DUCK. Before commencement, however, some
reorganisation was carried out. A new Corps HQ was created to look after
all operations in the area. Major General S.M. Shrinagesh, who was
Adjutant General at Army HQ, was promoted Lieutenant General and
appointed GOC XV Corps in September 1948. By this time, Skardu had
fallen to the enemy after a 10-month-long siege and several unsuccessful
attempts to relieve the beleaguered garrison under the command of Colonel
Sher Jung Thapa of the Kashmir State Forces.
At this time, Leh was held only by a weak battalion. Its defence was made
possible by an audacious venture, for which the credit must go to
Thimayya, at least for suggesting it. On 22 May 1948, the enemy had
attacked the bridge at Khalatse and the State Forces detachment guarding it
had pulled back to Leh. The next day, Major Prithi Chand, who was in Leh,
sent an urgent message that the situation was critical and that if
reinforcements did not reach by the following day, Leh would have to be