Page 139 - The Social Animal
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Social Cognition 121


           hat? Beth’s consistency would probably lead you to conclude that the
           reason Beth kissed Scott is that Beth is a very affectionate person.
           But suppose you found out that almost everybody kisses Scott. The
           consensus would suggest that the reason Beth kissed Scott is that
           Scott is a very kissable person who everybody likes. Finally, if Beth
           kisses only Scott and no one else kisses Scott, the distinctiveness of
           the kissing is due to some special relationship between Beth and
           Scott; either they are in love or Scott has done something especially
           deserving of a kiss.
               Of course, the way we use information to make attributions can
           underlie far more important decisions than deciding why one person
           kisses another. Teachers must decide why students fail. Juries must
           decide innocence or guilt. Nations must decide how to respond to the
           provocations of other nations. In all such cases, a systematic weigh-
           ing of consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness information can be
           highly valuable and extraordinarily important.
               But do people really think this way? Are we as rational as Ben-
           tham and Kelley suggest we are? There is little argument that we are
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           capable of such behavior. For example, Benjamin Franklin reports
           that he routinely performed a felicific calculation by writing down
           the pros and cons for major decisions.There are times when many of
           us behave in the same way—as when purchasing a new car or decid-
           ing which college to attend. And the ease with which you could gen-
           erate conclusions about Beth and Scott when given the appropriate
           covariation information indicates that it is at least possible to think
           like a naive scientist. However, rational thought requires at least two
           conditions: (1) the thinker has access to accurate, useful information;
           and (2) the thinker has the mental resources needed to process life’s
           data. These conditions almost never hold in everyday life.
               We do not possess a “God’s-eye” view of the world—a perspec-
           tive that is all-knowing and free from bias. Consider something as
           simple as my car purchase. I probably do not know all the facts. If it’s
           a new model, long-term repair data simply do not exist. Further-
           more, my view of the car is bounded by my own limited perspective;
           I hear about the car primarily from advertisers, who are motivated to
           exaggerate its positive features. I have limited experience with the
           car—a 10-minute dealer-supervised test drive as opposed to long-
           term driving in all kinds of hazardous road and weather conditions.
           If something as common as a new-car purchase can be fraught with
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