Page 203 - The Social Animal

Self-Justification 185

Let me cite an example that is, alas, all too familiar to many peo-
ple. Suppose a person smokes cigarettes and then reads a report of
the medical evidence linking cigarette smoking to lung cancer and
other respiratory diseases. The smoker experiences dissonance. The
cognition “I smoke cigarettes” is dissonant with the cognition “ciga-
rette smoking produces cancer.” Clearly, the most efficient way for
this person to reduce dissonance in such a situation is to give up
smoking. The cognition “cigarette smoking produces cancer” is con-
sonant with the cognition “I do not smoke.”
But, for most people, it is not easy to give up smoking. Imagine
Sally, a young woman who tried to stop smoking but failed. What
will she do to reduce dissonance? In all probability, she will try to
work on the other cognition: “Cigarette smoking produces cancer.”
Sally might attempt to make light of evidence linking cigarette
smoking to cancer. For example, she might try to convince herself
that the experimental evidence is inconclusive. In addition, she
might seek out intelligent people who smoke and, by so doing, con-
vince herself that if Debbie, Nicole, and Larry smoke, it can’t be all
that dangerous. Sally might switch to a filter-tipped brand and de-
lude herself into believing that the filter traps the cancer-producing
materials. Finally, she might add cognitions that are consonant with
smoking in an attempt to make the behavior less absurd in spite of
its danger. Thus, Sally might enhance the value placed on smoking;
that is, she might come to believe smoking is an important and
highly enjoyable activity that is essential for relaxation: “I may lead a
shorter life, but it will be a more enjoyable one.” Similarly, she might
try to make a virtue out of smoking by developing a romantic, devil-
may-care self-image, flouting danger by smoking cigarettes. All such
behavior reduces dissonance by reducing the absurdity of the notion
of going out of one’s way to contract cancer. Sally has justified her
behavior by cognitively minimizing the danger or by exaggerating
the importance of the action. In effect, she has succeeded either in
constructing a new attitude or in changing an existing attitude.
Indeed, shortly after the publicity surrounding the original Sur-
4
geon General’s report in 1964, a survey was conducted to assess peo-
ple’s reactions to the new evidence that smoking helps cause cancer.
Nonsmokers overwhelmingly believed the health report, only 10 per-
cent of those queried saying that the link between smoking and can-
cer had not been proven to exist; these respondents had no motivation
to disbelieve the report. The smokers faced a more difficult quandary.