Page 385 - Ranah Studi Agraria: Penguasaan Tanah dan Hubungan Agraris
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Ranah Studi Agraria

            season labor supply—even in these crowded conditions and
            with widespread landlessness, labor recruitment can be a prob-
            lem at peak periods, as we will see in the next section—and
            also commonly tie these laborers more securely by keeping

            them supplied with loans.
                This brief summary of the complex and heterogeneous
            patterns of tenancy in the sample villages—heterogeneous not
            only in form but also in function—suggests that fixed-rent trans-
            actions occur mainly between inded households and with
            rented land flowing from smaller to larger owners or between
            large owners; share-tenanted land, on the other hand, will gene-
            rally flow from larger owners to smaller owners and the land-
            less. This pattern of countervailing flows of fixed-rent and share
            tenancies, and the frequency of ‘horizontal’ flows of fixed-rent
            tenancies within the landowner classes, is confirmed by de-
            tailed analysis of tenancy flows in Rowosari and Kebanggan
            (Suseno et al. 1981; Retno Setyowati et al. 1982); under such
            conditions, even high tenancy rates do not make the distribu-
            tion of operated holdings differ greatly from the distribution
            of landownership.
                Little information is available from the 1981 surveys on
            the mechanisms which have produced the large increases in

            the proportions of households without paddy farms which we
            have seen in Table 7.4. Since the proportions of noncultivating
            owners (cf. Table 7.7) are not large, these increases must ref-
            lect either the loss of land through sale, the loss of tenancy
            rights (particularly share tenancies if the preceding arguments
            are correct), or increasing numbers of ‘new’ households who
            because of the absence or small size of parental holdings did

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