Page 36 - KFTL Report

KFTL DUE DILIGENCE – Kingston, Jamaica
8 Statement of KFTL Maintenance Processes & Procedures
8.1 Maintenance Processes & Procedures
Little to no evidence was witnessed regarding a robust, comprehensive set of maintenance/ repair departmental processes and procedures.
On the very last day of Trent’s time on-site we sighted 4 documents that were detailed process documents created in the IBM Blue-works Live solution. The 4 documents sighted, we suspect would have been a small percentage of the complete suite. We were advised that KCTL had performed these works, with some of the now KFTL people, but for some reason, this process related works etc. had not made their way over to KFTL.
It is KCTL’s approach to process mapping and procedures that Trent is most familiar with and should be the core standard from which the business operates.
KFTL’s lack of clarity around processes and procedures, and the proper integration of same through each department, is part of the reason why KFTL is and will continue to struggle to achieve visible continuous improvements, given such an unclear and unknown baseline.
It is recommended that KFTL develop an Engineering Standard Policy Manual, defining in detail, all processes associated with all maintenance and engineering activities. This manual could, if required, be adopted and become the base document to be implemented by the CMA-CGM Group in all of its terminals globally. This item has been captured in Section 14 below.
8.2 Maintenance & Repair Overview
a) Planned maintenance task lists are not timed and do not define number of person or man- hours required to fulfil the tasks.
b) There is a focus on trying to schedule and maintain integrity on planned maintenance activities.
c) Given the state of components and general dis-repair of some items, it was understood by Trent that PM activities would take priority over a corrective repair.
d) The recently formed ERT (Emergency Response Team), process is unclear, as this is in effect a 100% focused fire-fighting team.
e) There is a lack of clarity around responsibilities between ERT and PM teams when dealing with corrective repairs and the handover of that between the two teams.
f) The planning teams plan primarily PM activities.
g) The process for emergency events (breakdowns) is ad-hoc and operates as a near stand- alone entity.
h) The process and procedure for generation of Work Orders (WO’s) related to emergency breakdowns is unclear and un-documented. WO’s are by enlarge not generated, persons are not assigned to the breakdown task, and as such many (most likely the large part) of emergency WO’s are not recorded, rendering performance measurement/KPI’s of the equipment a near meaningless exercise.
i) The planned maintenance process is often broken by what we were advised as being ‘Ghost Ships’, these are container vessels that were not known about, and appeared at short notice, accepted by Operations, and as such breaks/halts the maintenance process. It was
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