Page 66 - Ciancia, On Civilization's Edge
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hierarchical logic that had long been central to Western civilizing missions. Even those who rejected
Polish national chauvinism and anti-Semitism and fostered interethnic cooperation believed that
Poles were the sole political and civilizational leaders in the region.
While battles over Volhynia occurred between states and proto-states on this global level,
members of the Borderland Guard who attempted to import their version of democracy into the
occupied territories simultaneously shaped and were shaped by a much messier set of local realities.
Their unpublished sources, which constituted speculative musings at a time when state borders were
in flux rather than a comprehensive vision of nationality policies, reveal important dynamics that are
overlooked if we focus solely on top-down discussions of Polish nationalism. Not only can we see
how the flexible language of civilizational hierarchies at a local level gave emerging stakeholders in
the Polish state project a way of promoting their own political visions against those of others (Polish
or otherwise), but we can also trace the emerging alternatives to the official policy of minority rights.
Far from simply taking on the idea that had been enshrined in Poland’s Minority Treaty—that non-
Polish populations were legally equal citizens whose rights as minorities the state was obligated to
respect—Polish elites experimented with criteria that simultaneously included and excluded the
diverse populations that came under their rule. As it turned out, class and economic realities always
interacted with imaginative local constructions of national groups.
The Polish occupation did not last for too much longer. In April 1920, the leaders of the
Polish state and its new and soon-to-be-defunct Ukrainian counterpart agreed to cooperate militarily
in order to push the Bolsheviks back toward the east and allow for the establishment of a Ukrainian
state that would act as a Polish-supported buffer against Russian aggression (while keeping the
Polish-occupied areas of Volhynia as part of the Polish state). The initiative failed. Following the
collapse of the Kiev offensive, the Red Army advanced as far as Warsaw in the summer of 1920,
only to retreat through the region after the Battle of Warsaw, leaving more destruction in its wake.
The transition from occupation to state administration was marked by significant institutional
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