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addition, it appears that the director must proceed for an injunction under § 14a whenever an agency has
        been convicted as a repeat offender under § 14b’s criminal provisions.

            Administrative  Action.        Under  §  9  the  Department  is  given  the  power  to
        “refuse to issue or renew, or may revoke, suspend, place on probation, reprimand or
        take  other  disciplinary  action  .  .  .,  including  fines  not  to  exceed  $5,000  for  a  first
        violation  and  not  to  exceed  $10,000  for  a  second  or  subsequent  violation,”  for  any
        violation of the myriad prohibitions in § 9 (see generally Sharp Thinking No. 66 (June
                                 2012).    Consumers  are  permitted  to  instigate  disciplinary
                                 proceedings by filing a written complaint with the Department
                                 (§ 10).  However, this results in a somewhat complex hearing process before a
                                 hearing officer and a disciplinary board a majority of the members of which are
                                 employed by registrant collection agencies (§§ 9.22, 13.1, 13.3, 19, 22).  While
                                 the  Department  is  not  bound  to  accept  the  board’s  recommendation,  it  is
                                 obligated to give the board a “written and specific explanation” if it overrules the
                                 recommendation (§ 13.3).

            Private Cause of Action.  The reader of only the act’s text would conclude that the only remedies
        provided  for  an  injured  debtor  are  the  right  to  complain  to  the  Department  and  the  right  to  seek  an
        injunction.  For example, § 9, by its terms, authorizes only the Department to take action for violation of its
        numerous  provisions.    This  inference  is  bolstered  by  §  9.7,  which,  by  its  terms,  authorizes  only  the
        attorney  general  to  enforce  indicated  violations  of  the  Act  under  the  Consumer  Fraud  &  Deceptive
        Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505.

            However, case law holds that the act authorizes a private cause of action.  Sherman
        v.  Field  Clinic,  74  Ill.App.3d  21  (1979);  Grant-Hall  v.  Cavalry  Portfolio  Serv.,  LLC,  __
        F.Supp.2d  __,  2012  WL  619651  (N.D.  Ill.  2012).    See  also  Randolph  v.  Crown  Asset
        Mgmt.,  LLC,  254  F.R.D.  513  (2008)  (approving  class-action  treatment  for  private  suit).
        This line of decisions includes cases arising under § 9.  See Kim v. Riscuity, Inc., 2006
        WL 2192121 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Trull v. GC Serv. L.P., 961 F.Supp. 1199 (N.D. Ill. 1997).  It
        even appears to allow recovery of punitive damages in some cases (see Sherman).

            However,  unlike  with  the  federal  Fair  Debt  Collection  Practices  Act  (see  Sharp
                          Thinking No. 64 (May 2012)), the cases under the state act require that the debtors
                          have  sustained  actual  injury  in  order  to  state  a  claim  under  the  act.    McCabe  v.
                          Crawford & Co., 272 F.Supp.2d 736 (N.D. Ill. 2003).  An impact on one’s credit score
                          is  actual  injury  (Riscuity),  as  is  paying  a  filing  fee  to  defend  against  a  wrongly-
                          brought  lawsuit  (Herkert  v.  MRC  Rec.  Corp.,  655  F.Supp.2d  870  (N.D.  Ill.  2009);
                          Grant-Hall).    Mere  attorney  fees  are  not  considered  actual  damages,  however
                          (McCabe; Grant-Hall).

            Statute of Limitations.  A 5-year statute of limitations applies for actions against registrants
        under the act.  A continuing violation is assumed to have occurred when it  first occurred for these
        purposes.  § 9.5.

                                                                   -   John T. Hundley, Jhundley@lotsharp.com, 618-242-0246

        John\SharpThinking\#67.doc

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