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that are subject to memorialization in a more complete contractual document (see Sharp Thinking No. 59
        (March 2012)).  Ironically, Citadel Group Ltd. v. Washington Reg. Med. Ctr., 692 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2012),
        makes no reference to BPI Energy Holdings, Inc. v. IEC (Montgomery), LLC, 664 F.3d 131 (7th Cir. 2011),
        about which we wrote there.

             “A preliminary writing that reflects a tentative agreement contingent upon the successful completion of
        negotiations that are ongoing[] does not amount to a contract that binds the parties,” the recent panel
        stated.  Moreover, such a document need not expressly disavow intent to form a contract; “magic words
        are not required. . . . Words expressing contingency or dependence on a subsequent event or agreed-on
        element will do. . . . (i)f the parties’ written words do not show a clear intent to be bound, then they will not
        be  held  to  a  preliminary  agreement.”    In  addition,  the  panel  noted  that  “omission  of  crucial  terms  is
        powerful evidence that no contract was intended.”

                             “Consumer Fraud Act” Is Liberally Applied

             If fraud is not required for a violation of the so-called “Consumer Fraud Act” (see Sharp Thinking No.
        19 (April 2009), a recent decision of the Illinois Appellate Court in Chicago demonstrates that an injury to
        a consumer is not required either.

             In Platinum Partners Value Arbitrage Fund, L.P. v. Chicago Board Options Exchange, 2012 IL App
        (1st) 112903, the plaintiff was a securities arbitrage fund.  Moreover, the transaction had nothing to do
        with the typical consumer transaction: plaintiff was allegedly injured by purchasing  “put” options on the
        Chicago Board Options Exchange.  Despite the context, a majority of the appellate panel found that an
        action under the Consumer Fraud & Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505) was stated.  “The
        Consumer Fraud Act is to be interpreted liberally” and is meant to “eradicate(e) all forms of deceptive and
        unfair business practices,” the majority said.

                  Courts Reinterpret, Uphold Employee Classification Act

             Panels in two districts of the Appellate Court have interpreted the Employee Classification Act (820
        ILCS 185) (see Sharp Thinking No. 11 (Aug. 2008)) so as to avoid the constitutional considerations which
        led to Bartlow v. Shannon, 399 Ill.App.3d 560 (2010) (see Sharp Thinking No. 38 (Oct. 2010)).

             In World Painting Co. v. Costigan, 2012 IL App (4th) 110869, and Bartlow v. Costigan, 2012 IL App
        (5th)  110519,  the  courts,  in  order  to  construe  the  Act  as  constitutional,  interpreted  the  Department  of
        Labor’s  powers  thereunder  as  merely  investigatory  and  not  involving  adjudicatory  findings  of  liability.
        Moreover, the panel in Bartlow v. Costigan held that subsequent court proceedings are de novo and said
        that if the Department goes to court “[t]he Department has the burden of proving a violation of the Act, and
        the  circuit  court  decides  if  penalties  or  sanctions  are  justified  and  what  penalties,  sanctions,  or  other
        remedies  to  impose  .  .  .  a  contractor  accused  of  violating  the  Act  is  afforded  all  of  the  due  process
                                                                            1
        protections contained in” the codes of civil and criminal procedure.   An order by the Department to cease
        and  desist  was  termed  by  the  court  “a  no-consequence  order”  and  the  Department’s  findings  were
        deemed not admissible in any court proceedings.

                                                                     -- John T. Hundley, 618-242-0246, Jhundley@lotsharp.com
        John\Sharp Thinking\#77.doc

        1
          The Sharp Law Firm, P.C., represented the plaintiffs in Bartlow v. Shannon, 399 Ill.App.3d 560 (2010).
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                                           THE  SHARP  LAW  FIRM,  P.C.

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          Terry Sharp: Tsharp@lotsharp.com; John T. Hundley: Jhundley@lotsharp.com; Rebecca L. Reinhardt: Rreinhardt@lotsharp.com;
                                             Bentley J. Bender: Bbender@lotsharp.com


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