Page 6 - Jan Feb March 2019
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state court has the power to hold a foreclosure suit “open to allow deficiency-judgment proceedings after
        the bankruptcy end[s].”

             The parties disputed the meaning of the bankruptcy judge’s lift-stay order – the debtor emphasizing
        the “full and complete” language while the bank focused on the “with respect to the property” clause – but
        Easterbrook said it was “unnecessary to determine the meaning” of that order.
             “Allowing  the  state  judiciary  to  enter  a  deficiency  judgment  in  a  foreclosure  proceeding  does  not
        undermine any function of bankruptcy law,” he stated. He said interpreting the lift-stay order as the bank
        argued would “compel the sort of claim splitting forbidden by state law.”
                                  Anderson can be criticized on the ground that its views on Illinois law on claim-
                             splitting  are  unreliably  documented.    Two  key  sentences  –  one  noted  above,  the
                             second being summarized in the immediately preceding paragraph – cite no cases at
                             all,  and  a  longer  discussion  elsewhere  is  based  solely  on  Illinois  Appellate  Court
                             cases.  The Illinois Supreme Court has said Appellate Court opinions are not binding
                             on other appellate panels.  O’Casek v. Children’s Home & Aid Soc., 892 N.E.2d 994,
                             1006-07 (Ill. 2008).
                                  Moreover, Anderson can be criticized as pursuing the Seventh Circuit’s interest
                             in claim preclusion at the expense of respect for bankruptcy courts.  “[B]ankruptcy
                             judges lack the salary and tenure protections of Article III [of the U.S. Constitution],
        which means that they cannot exercise the same powers as district judges over disputes arising under
        state law,” the court wrote in what seemed to be an unnecessary swipe.  It does not
        follow  that  their  limited  authority  –  and  their  decisions  –  are  not  to  be  respected.
        Anderson is a case in which the creditor appears to have given the bankruptcy court
        more respect than the Court of Appeals does.
             Nonetheless,  Anderson’s  result  is  not  necessarily  wrong.    Bankruptcy  courts
        often give relief for state-court proceedings to determine not only the fact of liability
        but also the extent of damages.  Arguably that is the result here.  But ordinarily in
        those situations the lift-stay order is examined to determine what the state court is
        permitted to do.   It was just such an order in Anderson that the court says is immaterial.

             Ordinarily when a panel of the Seventh Circuit issues such a dubious opinion we would say that one
        should look for a petition for rehearing by the full court.  However, because of questions about appellate
        jurisdiction that are not germane to this article, Anderson states that it already has been circulated to the
        full court and no judges favored a hearing by the full court.  So, unless review is sought and granted by
        the U.S. Supreme Court, Anderson looks to be the law governing these matters in this circuit.
             That means that creditors’ rights attorneys need to familiarize themselves with the decision pronto.
        Effective  immediately,  in  cases  where  the  bankrupt  has  assets  or  income  that  may  be  available  for
        unsecured  creditors,  creditors’  counsel  need  to  convince  both  bankruptcy  and  foreclosure  courts  that
        Anderson  means  that  the  foreclosure  courts  can  and  should  enter  deficiency  judgments  against
        bankrupts.  And it likely means that, where possible, counsel should go back before foreclosure courts to
        have deficiencies entered in cases where that relief was not sought under the belief that it could not be.
                                                                                                Brenda/SharpThinking/#165.pdf
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