Page 14 - John Hundley 2008
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5/15-1508(b),  there  is  the  requirement  that  confirmation  occur  “[u]pon  motion  and  notice  in
        accordance with court rules”.  The withdrawal of the motion to confirm prevented triggering of the four
        statutory factors, which the Court at times appeared to recognize were mandatory when confirmation
        was properly sought.
             Several observations may be made in the wake of this important decision.

             First,  little  in  the  opinion  can be  read  to create any  rights in the  owner-mortgagor.    The
        Court did not  recognize  any  right  to  extension  of the  statutory  redemption  period,  nor any  right  to
        equitable  redemption,  nor  any  right  to  prevail  if  confirmation  is  sought  by  the  mortgagee  over  the
        mortgagor’s  objection.     It  repeatedly  characterized  the  owner-mortgagor’s  ability  to  satisfy  the
        mortgage through the private sale as one of “grace” extended by the mortgagee.

             Second, the argument over the trial court’s discretion on confirmation is likely to continue.
        While the Court at times termed the § 15-1508(b) factors “mandatory,” it also suggested those factors
        “confer[] on circuit courts broad discretion in approving or disapproving  judicial sales”.      Lewis thus
        seems to put off to another day what judicial action may constitute an abuse of discretion in light of
        the “justice was not otherwise done” factor in § 15-1508(b).

             Third, Lewis will contribute to the tendency for foreclosure sales to be largely mortgagee-
        only  occurrences.    Under  Lewis,  a  successful  mortgagee  bidder  has  control  over  whether
        confirmation of his bid will be sought, while an outsider has no say on that point if his bid is accepted.
        Also, the mortgagee, as the judgment creditor, usually is able to bid all or a portion of the judgment,
        while the outsider typically must tie up cash money – without, apparently, the right to compensation
        for being deprived of the use of that money if the plaintiff then declines to seek confirmation.  Finally,
        outsiders’  ability  to  arrange  financing  for  such  bids  certainly  will  be  hindered  by  the  Court’s
        characterization of successful bidders’ rights as simply “speculative.”

             Fourth, Lewis does not address a party’s ability to attack a sale by attacking some other
        aspect of  the  foreclosure  proceeding.    A foreclosure  sale being  based  on  the foreclosure  judg-
        ment, if that judgment was void, e.g., for lack of proper service on a necessary party, the sale will fall
        with the vacating of the judgment.  See Mortgage Elec. Systems v. Gipson, 379 Ill. App. 3d 622, 884
        N.E.2d 796 (2008); Bank of N.Y. v. Unknown Heirs, 369 Ill. App. 3d 472, 860 N.E.2d 1113 (2006).
        Moreover, JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Fankhauser, 2008 WL 2313319,  No. 2-07-0140 (Ill. App. 2d
        Dist. slip op. June 4, 2008), holds that the judgment of foreclosure is not a final judgment – even if the
        Court  says  there  is  no  just  reason  to  delay  enforcement  or  appeal  –  until  the  sale  is  confirmed.
        Hence, under Fankhauser, a party can seek reconsideration of the foreclosure judgment under the
        relatively liberal standards of 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e) up until 30 days after the sale is confirmed.

             Fifth, in light of those factors, look for calls for the statute to be amended.  IMFL was adopted
        some 20 years ago with promises that it would make mortgage foreclosure sales more commercially
        reasonable and productive.  Its success in meeting those goals has been modest, and likely will be
        diminished even further in light of the recent rulings.


                                                                                                John\SharpThinking\#9a.doc
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