Page 18 - John Hundley 2008
P. 18

the firm hires  and  pays  its  own  employees and  reports  their  income  to  the  IRS;  and  whether firm
        personnel represent themselves to be employees of the contractor.  Failing any one of those tests
        apparently means there is not a legitimate proprietorship or partnership and that all of items
        (1)-(3) must be met.
             Before this statute, whether an individual working for a construction contractor was an employee
        or an independent contractor was determined according to the common law. Under the common-law
        approach, courts on a case-by-case basis considered several factors, such as the right to control, the
        skill  involved  in  the  work,  the  method  of  payment,  the  work  schedule,  the  right  to  discharge,  who
        provided tools, materials and equipment, whether the worker’s occupation was related to that of the
        employer,  and  who  paid  for  insurance,  social  security  and  taxes.  See  Wheaton  v.  Suwana,  355
        Ill.App.3d 506, 823 N.E.2d 993.  Under the common-law approach, no single factor was deter-
        minative,  although  the  right  to  control  the  work  was  the  most  important.    Wenholdt  v.  Industrial
        Com’n, 95 Ill.2d 76, 447 N.E.2d 404 (1983).
             The Act can be expected to increase findings that workers are employees.  This is so because
        the  Act  starts  out  with  a  presumption  in  favor  of  employee  status,  because  failing  any  one  factor
        apparently is fatal on the “sole proprietorship or partnership” test, and because failing any one of the
        § 10(b)(1)-(3) factors results in a finding of employee status.
             The  Act  applies  only  to  the  construction  industry.    Hence,  the  common-law  approach  will
        continue to apply to other industries, and the Act may be subject to a challenge as special
        legislation.   The Illinois Constitution provides that the legislature may “pass no special or local law
        when a general law is or can be made applicable.”  This prohibits the legislature from conferring a
        special  benefit  or  privilege  on  one  group  and  excluding  others  similarly  situated.    General  Motors
        Corp. v. State Motor Vehicle Review Bd., 224 Ill.2d 1, 862 N.E.2d 209
        (2007).    A  special-legislation  inquiry  looks  first  at  whether  the  statute
        discriminates in favor of a select group, and if it does, then at whether
        the classification is arbitrary.  Not only does this Act apply only to one
        industry, its scope is further limited by its definitions of “construction” and
        “performing services.”  The first prong of a special-legislation challenge
        appears to be met.

             The legislative record evidences three reasons for adopting the
        Act:  (1)  construction  contractors  who  classify  workers  as  independent
        contractors  are  able  to  underbid  other  contractors;    (2)  construction
        employees lose benefits, rights and protections under State and Federal
        law by being treated as independent contractors; and (3) the State loses millions of dollars in income
        taxes which are more difficult to collect from non-employees.  Item (3) clearly applies to all industries,
        but it is arguable that item (1) is especially associated with the construction industry, and that due to
        the dangers and seasonal nature of construction work, making sure workers are covered by unem-
        ployment and worker compensation insurance (item (2)) is especially important in that industry. To
        date,  however, the  courts have  not  considered  whether those  reasons  would  save  the  Act from a
        constitutional challenge as being arbitrary.
                                                                                            Linda\sharpoffice\sharpthinking\issue11
        ●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●
                                            THE SHARP LAW FIRM, P.C.

                    1115 Harrison, P.O. Box 906, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864 • Telephone 618-242-0246 • Facsimile 618-242-1170

            Business Transactions • Litigation • Financial Law • Problem Finances • Real Estate • Corporate • Commercial Disputes • Creditors’ Rights
                                                Arbitration • Estate Planning • Probate

               Terry Sharp: law@lotsharp.com; John T. Hundley: Jhundley@lotsharp.com; Mandy Combs: Mcombs@lotsharp.com;
                                 Real Estate Closing and Title Services, see www.sharptitleservices.com

                                                        Advertising Material
   13   14   15   16   17   18   19   20   21   22   23