Page 22 - John Hundley 2008
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However, citation proceedings are derived from the creditor’s bill in equity, not garnish-
        ment  statutes,  and  as  codified  in  the  old  Civil  Practice  Act  citations  were  subject  to  the
        command that that Act be liberally construed.  Moreover, the principle that one interprets statutory
        provisions granting powers as jurisdictional has been undercut greatly by the fact that Illinois now has
        circuit courts of general jurisdiction.  The 7th Circuit’s implication that Rule 69 permits federal courts
        to pick and choose which parts of state judgment-enforcement law they wish to respect is doubtful,
        but its conclusion that the 6-month provision of Rule 277 is not a jurisdictional issue subject to strict
        construction is on more solid ground.  Moreover, the conclusion that the 6-month deadline can be
        implicitly waived has much force.

             MAT also invoked § 2-1402(c)(1), providing that a court can order turnover of “choses in action,
        property or effects in his or her possession or control . . . to which his or her title or right of possession
        is not substantially disputed”.  Because MAT disputed the debt, it argued that the turnover order was
        improper.    However,  the  court  noted  that  §  2-1402(c)(1)  applies  only  to  orders  against  judgment
        debtors, and there is no “no-dispute” clause in provisions applicable to third parties.  Accordingly, it
        ruled  that  the  district  court  was  empowered  to  resolve  the  third  party’s  dispute  by  way  of
        evidentiary  hearing  and  to  enter  the  order  against  the  third  party.    We  think  this  conclusion
        correct; contrary to common assumption, the no-dispute rule is a protection of the absent third-party’s
        right to present evidence that he does not owe the debt (or in the amount claimed), not an analog to
        the old garnishment maxims that the debt be due and liquidated.
                              Laborers’ Pension Fund does not dispel all questions which lurk when citations
                          are  employed.    In  fact,  it  raises  some  new  ones.    Key  among  these  are  the  lien
                          effects of a citation.  Historically, citations created no lien; liens on personal property
                          were created by delivering a certified copy of the judgment to the sheriff (see 735
                          ILCS  5/12-111).    However,  citations  were  permitted  to  include  a  transfer-restraint
                          provision (see § 2-1402(f)(1)), and they often did.  The date of service of a citation
                          with such a restraint started being treated as a date of attachment in priority disputes,
                          particularly  in  bankruptcy  contexts,  and  out  of  that  practice  arose  the  idea  that
                          service  of  a  citation  on  a  judgment  debtor  effected  a  lien  on  all  his  non-exempt
        personal property.  Eventually § 2-1402(m)(1) was added, so providing.

             But what does this mean? If the debtor fails to disclose certain property at the citation examina-
        tion and the proceeding is closed, has the creditor lost his priority if the property is later discovered?
        What if property is not disclosed but the citation is never formally dismissed?  Does the lien continue?

             And since § 2-1402(m)(2) extends the lien principle to property in the possession of third
        parties, how long are they affected?  This question is important in light of the fact that third-party
        citation proceedings are often extended, formally or informally, pending the respondent’s production
        of documents, the creditor’s review of same, etc.  Often the proceedings then are thought to “die on
        the vine” for lack of a subsequent order under Rule 277(f).  Given Laborers’ Pension Fund, to avoid
        later claims that they violated the lien of an informally-extended citation, or failed to comply with the
        citation’s demands, prudent third parties now will demand formal dismissal orders

                                                                                                                                                                                                  John/SharpThinking\#13.doc
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