Page 4 - John Hundley 2008
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the debtor as “Roger House” instead of “Rodger House”  was seriously misleading.

             ► In re FV Steel & Wire Co., 310 B.R. 390 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.2004), and In re Asheboro Precision Plastics,
        Inc., 2005 WL 1287743 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2005), finding filings under trade names ineffective.
             ► Receivables Purch. Co. v. R & R Directional Drilling, L.L.C., 263 Ga.App. 649, 588 S.E.2d 831 (2003),
        finding a filing against “Net work Solutions, Inc.” ineffective as to Network Solutions, Inc.
             ► Host America Corp. v. Coastline Financial, Inc., 2006 WL 1579614 (D. Utah 2006), finding that listing
        the debtor as “K W M Electronics Corporation” instead of “K.W.M. Electronics Corporation” was misleading.

             ► In re Fuell, 2007 WL 4404643 (Bankr. D. Ida. 2007), finding a statement seriously misleading in listing
        the debtor as Andrew Fuel rather than Andrew Fuell.

             ►  In  re  Borden,  2007  WL  2407032  (D.  Neb.  2007),  finding  use  of  “Mike  Borden”  instead  of  Michael
        Borden seriously misleading.

             ► Corona Fruits & Veggies, Inc. v. Frozsun Foods, Inc., 143 Cal.App.4th 319, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 868 (2006),
        finding the listing as “Armando Munoz” misleading as to Armando Munoz Juarez.
             ► In re John’s Bean Farm of Homestead, Inc., 378 B.R. 385 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007), finding a listing of
        “John Bean Farms, Inc.” ineffective as to “John’s Bean Farm of Homestead, Inc.”
            Critics argue such decisions fly in the face of the trend of modern law to do substantial justice.
         Moreover,  such  decisions  incorrectly  assume  that  each  individual  has  an  “exact  full  legal  name”.    To  the
         contrary, a treatise often cited as stating Illinois law defines a name as “the designation by which the person is
         distinctively known in the community” and states, “Where two names have the same original derivation, or
         where one of such names is a contraction or corruption of the other name, and in common usage they are
         considered one and the same ... the use of one name for the other is entirely immaterial”; the “name by which
         a person is commonly or usually known will be good, even though it differs from the name given in baptism”;
         and  a  “person  may  be  designated  in  legal  proceedings  by  the  name  by  which  he  is  commonly  known,
         although it is not his true name” (27A I.L.P. Names § 1).  Moreover, a person generally may change his or her
         name without resort to legal proceedings, provided the intent is not to defraud, “and for all purposes the name
         thus assumed will constitute his or her legal name just as much as though he or she had borne it from birth”
         (id. § 2).  And if two spellings “according to the ordinary rules of pronouncing the English language, may be
         sounded alike ... the variance is prima facie immaterial” (id. § 9).  If the debtor lawfully made the contract as
         Mike Borden, can the creditor really be faulted for using the same name on the financing statement?
            However,  creditors  ignore  such  decisions  at their  peril.    And  it  is no  answer  that  “‘Mike’  would
         never stick it to me for not calling him ‘Michael’”.  This is so because the error usually will not be raised by
         “Mike”.  It may be raised by any subsequent creditor seeking to climb in front of the filed financing statement,
         and it may be raised by a bankruptcy trustee exercising his “strong arm” powers on behalf of a hypothetical
         lien creditor.  See In re Fuell, 2007 WL 4404643 (Bankr. D. Ida. 2007).  What that means is that even if every
         creditor involved in fact knew that Mike Borden was Michael Borden, the defect can nonetheless be used to
         attack  the  “defective”  financing  statement.    Indeed,  because  bankruptcy  trustees  generally  have  a  duty  to
         maximize the recovery for the unsecured creditors – not the secureds – they often believe they have a legal
         duty to attack any secured lien which is defective.  Accordingly, to avoid such attacks, creditors would be well-
         advised to require debtors to submit proof of their correct names – and in the case of potential variances, to
         file financing statements against each of those variances.

                                                                                                       John\Sharp Thinking\#4.doc
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