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said “No funds shall be withdrawn from the minor’s account without prior court order.”   Notwithstanding
        that order, the bank permitted the mother to dissipate substantially all the funds before the child reached
        majority and discovered the withdrawals.

            Arguing that the essence of the action was breach of contract, the son sued his mother and the bank
        after  reaching  majority.    Invoking  the  10-year  limitation  of  735  ILCS  5/13-206,  the  son  was  met  by  a
        motion for summary judgment from the bank, which invoked the UCC’s three-year limitation set forth in
        810 ILCS 5/4-111.  The Appellate Court ruled that the more specific UCC provision prevailed over the
        more general contract provision and hence the action was subject to the three-year bar.

            ► However, the court went on to hold that the “discovery rule” applied.  Under this common-law rule,
        the  limitations  period  does  not  begin  to  run  until  the  plaintiff  discovers,  or  has  reason  to  discover,  the
        cause of action.  Because the mother had concealed her dissipation from the son and he allegedly had no
        practical way to discover it until less than three years before the action was filed, the court ruled that the
        action may have been timely.  It reversed summary judgment for the bank and sent the case back for
        proceedings to determine when the son knew or had reason to know that a cause of action might exist.

        Memo Meets Requirements for 10-Year Statute of Limitations


            A  signed  memo  stating  simply  “Loaned  to  [Debtor]  $100,000  to  be  paid  back  with  interest”  is  a
        sufficient writing to invoke Illinois’ 10-year period for the statute of limitations, a panel in the First District of
        the Appellate Court ruled in January.

            In Kranzler v. Saltzman, __ Ill.App.3d __, 2011 WL 181444 (2011), the court rejected an argument that
        the memo did not constitute a sufficient contract for purposes of the statute set forth in 735 ILCS 5/13-
        206,  and  held  that  it  met  the  “other  evidences  of  indebtedness  in  writing”  clause  in  that  statute.    The
        memo fairly contained an implied promise to pay, and that was sufficient, the court said.  Moreover, the
        court said, the statutory period on such a claim begins to run not when the writing or loan is made, but
        when the defendant stops making payments.

                Exchange Investigated Check in Reasonable Manner

            A currency exchange which investigates a suspicious check in a commercially reasonable manner can
        be treated as a holder in due course despite its suspicions regarding the legitimacy of the check it cashes,
        a panel in the Appellate Court’s First District ruled recently.

            In New Randolph Halsted Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Regent Title Ins. Agency, LLC, 405 Ill.App.3d
        923, 939 N.E.2d 1024 (2010), the check misspelled the payee’s name, misstated the purpose, and was
        significantly greater in amount than checks the payee had cashed at the exchange previously.  However,
        the  exchange  phoned  the  check  writer  and  confirmed  the  check  payee  and  amount  (only  later  was  it
        uncovered that an employee of the payor-title company was issuing improper checks).  The court held
        that in light of the payor’s confirmation of the check, the mere suspicions of the exchange were insufficient
        to prevent it from being treated as a holder in due course.

                                                                       --John Hundley, Jhundley@lotsharp.com, 618-242-0246

                                                                                                      John\SharpThinking/#43.doc

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