Page 16 - John Hundley 2010
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issue  were  attorneys’  services  rendered  in  connection  with  the  client’s  withdrawal  as  trustee  in  a
        structured-settlement  arrangement.    According  to  the  evidence  adduced  at  trial,  the  trustee’s
        lawyers knew when it withdrew from the trust that the trust assets were being turned over to a
        firm which was not authorized to act as trustee in Illinois and was improperly affiliated with a
        party to the structured settlements.   After that party spent trust assets on other failing business
        ventures (and personal items, it was alleged), the victims who were supposed to receive payments
        from the structured settlement sued and the trustee was forced to pay large sums to settle the claims.
             The lawyers attempted to invoke the “case within a case” rule but the court rejected that attempt,
        noting  that  in  connection  with  the  withdrawal  as  trustee  the  lawyers  provided  transactional  legal
        services.    The  court  held  that  “proving  a  case-within-a-case  is  not  always  required  in  transaction-
        based legal malpractice cases where damages can otherwise be established.”  The relevant principle,
        it said, is that the plaintiff should “recover all the damages proximately caused by [the lawyers’]
        breach” of duty, and case-within-a-case is not the exclusive way of proving such damages.
             But a variant of case-within-a-case arose in connection with the client’s settlement of the post-
        withdrawal claims brought by the victims, the lawyers arguing  that the client had to prove it would
        have lost those cases.  The court had two key responses to this issue.  First, it rejected the premise
        that certainty of loss was required, because “rules should not be encouraged which allow a
        defendant no alternative but to litigate”.  Second, it employed a “reasonableness” test for whether
        the cases should have been settled, and ruled that this “was a question for the trier of fact”.  The jury
        had found the settlements reasonable, and the court deferred to it.  The court similarly deferred to the
        jury on the measure of damages (both sides appealed with respect to that).

             Several observations regarding this decision may be offered.  First, the court’s deferral to the jury
        on the causation and damage issues likely will draw criticism as ducking critical decisions.  But we
        think that those actions have a different import, because implicitly the deferrals to the jury’s deci-
        sions on those issues necessarily mean that those issues properly went to the jury.  Admitted-
        ly, this message is a bit understated, but that is in keeping with Union Planters’ whole approach.
                              For  example, even  on  its  key  issues  the  court  purports  not  to be  plowing  new
                         ground.  Only by remembering how “carved in stone” the “case within a case” rule
                         had  become  does  one  appreciate  the  significance  of  Union  Planters’  departure
                         therefrom.    And  only  by  consulting  its  citations  does  one  appreciate  that  those
                         decisions did not so much require the result Union Planters reached as permit it.

                              Moreover,  the  court’s  distinction  between  litigation  and  transactional  contexts
                         may prove unreliable.  In Union Planters itself the negligent withdrawal was effected
                         through a court order, and the subject damages were incurred in an additional series
        of suits.  Hence, characterizing the case as involving transactional malpractice was not a foregone
        conclusion (and is another example of Union Planters’ understated significance).  How the transaction
        v. litigation distinction will be applied in future cases is unclear.

             Perhaps that is why Union Planters qualifies case-within-a-case as only generally the rule even in
        the litigation context.  Or perhaps it seeks to align itself with those who would chip away at that rule
        even in the litigation context.
                                                                                                      John\SharpThinking\#35.doc.
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