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By the same token it appears that were a childless woman who
does not observe the laws of family purity to ask the physician what
to do in order to become pregnant, he must not advise her to have
relations with her husband on the tenth day of her menstrual cycle
[i.e. on the tenth day after the onset of menstrual bleeding], which
is the day of her ovulation. This would be giving her inappropriate
advice, causing her to transgress the prohibition of niddah [according
to which the earliest she is permitted to her husband is after twelve
days]. However, if she asks about her chances of becoming pregnant
on the tenth or eleventh day of her menstrual cycle and the physician
answers that medically speaking the chances are good, he would not
be violating lifnei iver because all he is doing is failing to prevent her
from sinning by lying. Since he is not actively offering her inappro-
priate advice and is not extending to her an opportunity to sin he
cannot be considered as putting a stumbling block in front of her; he
is merely assisting a sinner.

Thus if lying is liable to harm him, it is possible that the physician
is not obligated to do so. See later, towards the conclusion of our
discussion, where we mention a further rationale for ruling leniently
even in regard to the prohibition of assisting a sinner.

An additional argument that by answering the patient honestly the
physician is not violating the Torah prohibition of putting a stum-
bling block in front of a blind person can possibly be adduced from
the comments of the Igros Moshe (Yoreh Deah 1, 72) who was asked
by the owner of a hall in London whether he was allowed to rent his
hall to non-observant Jews who wanted to hold a wedding there with
mixed dancing.

He responded that the renter would not violate the Torah prohi-
bition of lifnei iver because in London they could rent a different hall
from gentiles, such that were the questioner to refuse to rent them
his hall they would find another hall elsewhere. Since they have other
opportunities of sinning, the hall owner is not akin to a person who
extends wine to a nazir “on the other side of a river.”

Moreover, the Igros Moshe proposes the novel argument that even
if no alternative venue is available, it should still logically be permit-

Giving Advice that will Enable a Sinner to Continue Sinning 2 263