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Rather [than being mentally infirm], it is in her nature to be insis-
tent and to achieve at any cost whatever she understands is in her best
interest, not even shrinking from suicide. It was similarly made clear
in the question that she is not deranged but if she has an unfortu-
nate experience she is unable to get the better of it but fights against
whatever is bothering her. If chalilah [Heaven forbid], a relative of
hers were to die she is capable of committing suicide in her anguish.
Therefore at the moment, in the present situation where it is the fetus
that bothers her, she cannot come to terms with its existence and if
she doesn’t manage to abort it she will commit suicide.

To summarize, the point we need to consider is: what is the
halachah in the case of a person who threatens that unless we violate
a specific sin in order to assuage his pain, he will commit suicide and
we know that this individual has already attempted suicide in order
to escape this pain. Are we allowed to violate the sin in order to save
a Jewish life, which is more precious than the Torah itself, or maybe
only in situations of dangerous illness or of being threatened with
death by non-Jews is it permitted to violate a Torah law but not when
there is no external compulsion forcing us to violate the Torah?

A similar question once arose in the city of Tiberias when non-ko-
sher meat (neveilos and tereifos) was found in a butcher shop that
was certified as kosher and the gaon Rav Rephael Hacohen Kook
zt”l, the head of the Tiberias beis din wanted to remove the store’s
kashrus certification. The storeowner threatened to commit suicide
if his kashrus supervision and certification were removed, for this
would deprive him of his source of livelihood. It was clear that this
was no empty threat and that he was liable to carry it out. At the
time the same question arose: was it permitted to leave his kashrus
certification intact because of the storeowner’s piku’ach nefesh or,
since no illness or compulsion by non-Jews was involved the man’s
suicide threat didn’t render this a situation of piku’ach nefesh that
sets aside Torah laws and it would be forbidden to leave his kashrus
certification intact?

In order to answer these questions, two points must be clarified:
1. Does a serious suicide threat constitute piku’ach nefesh? 2. Can a

354 1 Medical-Halachic Responsa of Rav Zilberstein